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ALLAN QUANDT

Allan Quandt has lived in northern Saskatchewan for over 30 years. He was an acitve member of the CCF and ran as a candidate in the 1960 provincial election. He was a friend of Malcolm Norris and Jim Brady.

HIGHLIGHTS:

- Early days of the CCF government.
- CCF programs for northern Saskatchewan.
- Arrival of Malcolm Norris and Jim Brady.
- Disillusionment with the CCF.
- The firing of Norris and Brady.
- The rape of Mary Norris in Prince Albert.

GENERAL COMMENTS:

Allan Quandt was Malcolm Norris' and Jim Brady's closest associate during their time in northern Saskatchewan. He was their political associate, worked with them and was a close friend as well. In this tape Quandt gives a brief description of when and why the men came to Saskatchewan; the initial

motives of the new CCF government in the north; the difficulties of both government and native leaders in dealing with a completely colonized native population - the problems of implementing a set of progressive programs in a top-down manner, having failed to secure the active support of those programs among the people affected. He describes the various jobs the two men had with the government and when and how each man came to leave the government. He touches briefly on other matters: the gradual entrenchment of conservative, professional bureaucrats and the negative affect on policy; Brady's and Norris' personal traits; efforts to fire both men.

INTERVIEW:

Allan: Really, what happened was that I think that the CCF were determined to do something about people in the northern part of Saskatchewan and it was well known that people in this part of the country suffered because of the fact that the only area they could go to to buy goods was the Hudson's Bay Company. Prices were exorbitantly high, usually the return for goods by way of furs and that was usually low, and it was just sort of the economy that they maintained these people just at a certain level to be able to get back the furs. Now this also applied as far as fish was concerned. Now, I don't know whether this was a cabinet decision but I can only speak of the time that I came into the thing and I think the determination

was made that they were going to do something in this part of the country. And they had in education, a fellow by the name of Chet Piercy was commissioned to do a study of northern Saskatchewan and he came up with the Piercy Report and this is supposed to be the key to changing things. Education, we have to educate people. They didn't realize what this was going to do, the cultural shock that was going to take place. And if you look at it now, in retrospect, you would see that what this has done has been a terrible thing. Education hasn't accomplished, we've gone back as far as....

Murray: The opposite.

Allan: Just the opposite. Because they just didn't understand. They wanted to do something, so Joe Phelps was the Minister of Natural Resources at that time and he wanted to get people in to the programs that they sort of envisaged by having people of Indian ancestry involved directly. Now, how he got next to Malcolm Norris, whether it was through the old Alberta Metis Association, I don't know. But this is how he came, it was through Malcolm Norris. And his executive assistant was a fellow by the name of Petty...

Mrs. Quandt: Henry Petty.

Allan: Henry Petty and he had made the contact and told me that a chap by the name of Malcolm Norris was coming and they were going to then decide just exactly how he would fit into the Department of Natural Resources. Now, I'll go back to this fisheries commission thing. They also commissioned a report,

or a commission was set up, to study freshwater fishing because the same thing that existed in the practices of fur, existed in the freshwater fishing industry.

Murray: High costs, low pay.

Allan: High, high, terribly high costs and they lived in almost a state of serfdom to the fish companies. There was Len Waite and there was Waite Fisheries and there were Booth Fisheries and there was these various people that came in and the fishermen went out and fished. And then, you know, actually following the Depression, there were a lot of people moved up into this part of the country, so there were a lot of white people involved. You got over into the Buffalo Narrows area and you saw a lot of Scandinavian people were involved. And there used to be a lot of people come up to La Ronge area, they would come up. That time - oh, what the dickens is the name there? - some fellow that had also construction, a construction crew that came up as far as Molanosa. Built the road up that far. I'll think of the name. Doesn't make any difference. Now these fellows were in the fishing purchase and they'd outfit with nets and so on and then these people would owe them for them and so on. So they brought in from Nova Scotia, a fellow that had gone through St. Francis Xavier at Antigonish, a fellow by the name of Gus MacDonald, Angus MacDonald. MacDonald is a very uncommon name in Nova Scotia.

Murray: I'm sure it is.

Allan: (chuckles) So anyhow, Gus MacDonald came out and he eventually became Director of Fisheries but he sat on this commission, and a guy by the name of Bert Mansfield and...pardon?

Mrs. Quandt: George Cadbury?

Allan: I don't know whether Cadbury was on, but I can't remember offhand. You can always get this information. But this fisheries commission had sittings at various places and they did this study and they went through. And Gus MacDonald incidently, stayed, we just saw him a couple of nights ago down on the dock. He's retired now but he eventually went with the United Nations and he's just come back from Zambia. But he became Director of Fisheries and I worked closely with Gus for a few years and you know, a marvelous...

Murray: Socialist?

Allan: Social democrat but a very well-intentioned person.

Murray: He knew Brady and Norris, too?

Allan: Yeah, yeah. Well, now the stage that Norris came in, let's see, in 1946, sometime in the winter. The first I recall meeting Malcolm Norris was Petty said to me, "Listen, Norris has come in. I'm busy. Would you go over and meet him for me?

I'd like to have you make him at home. Go over to the Empress Hotel. He should be checked in there." And I think that he had come in by train.

Murray: Where was this, in Saskatoon?

Allan: No, in Prince Albert. The old Empress Hotel is gone there. There is now a hamburger stand, an A&W hamburger, follow the Great Rootbear over to the A&W. So, by golly, I went up and I knocked at this room and I knocked at the door there of this room and that's the first that I ever met Malcolm Norris. And he was a really striking person, you know, really. And a fantastic intellect.

(Long pause)

I feel like, I suppose, like Berry. The only thing is that with him, it didn't hit him until he heard the kids sing.

Murray: At the memorial thing.

Allan: Yeah.

Mrs. Quandt: He had to go home he was so emotionally ill. Really...

Murray: A lot of people are really... I talked to Zenon Pohorecky in Saskatoon and he says he had a real soft spot in his heart for Malcolm.

Allan: Well, you see, he used the term 'laddie' a lot. And he said, "You know, laddie," he said, "I think probably we're going to get somewhere." He said, "It looks like we got a good government here." And he also did another thing that he usually did, he identified himself as...

Mrs. Quandt: Redskin Norris?

Allan: Right.

Murray: With a play on the word 'red'?

Allan: Yeah. And he did it because he was always very proud. He was always, as far as his Indian ancestry is concerned, probably the proudest individual I've ever known. I seen lots

of people, you know, that really great, but they just took it as a matter of fact. I would say he almost wore it like a medallion around his neck. And he would never back off and never allow anyone to say anything about anyone. And that wasn't only Indian people. He knew, you know, as a socialist, he knew that there was no place for discrimination.

Murray: Whether whites or Indians? Yeah, there are so many native people today in the Metis Society who on the outside talk about being proud of their native people but, at the same time, you catch them apologizing every once in a while. Even

Rod Bishop.

Allan: Well, you know, that's understandable.

Murray: Oh, for sure.

Allan: You know, it's understandable when you look at what happens to people so often. And I always say, you know, in the end the only one they hurt is themselves because it has to be a very painful thing. But Malcolm knew very well where he stood. He knew very well, as far as middle class capitalism is concerned, he knew exactly, he was anti-facist all the way. He was a real left wing socialist. He had faults. He was chauvinistic. I think that's a hangover probably from his Indian ancestry. At that time....

Murray: Nobody talked about that.

Allan: No one talked about it at the time and the thing is this, that we had some frank discussions on many things but we never touched on that. And Jim was the same way. And I think that the thing is that if you turn around and you look for

people that provide leadership and you're going to look for perfection, that will never come about.

Murray: Not in a capitalist society.

Allan: And it certainly isn't going to. Because eventually, at some period and state, people are only human and they probably may not have feet of clay but probably part of their feet are made up of a portion of clay anyhow. And I know that what I found over the years is that I've tried to look for too much in people, especially politically, and damned people because they didn't, you know,....

Mrs. Quandt: Live up to your expectations.

Allan: Well, they didn't come up to my expectations. I expected too much from them because they said they were something and I thought of them as something. They didn't come up to this. And the thing is that what I've learned is that, I think that probably what brought me to this - and now I'm not telling you about Malcolm Norris, only trying to explain a little bit about him - and that is that my understanding of this probably is like the Vietnam war when they tried to get a government of national accord. You recognize that you have got elements within the country that are there. It isn't the case of today you have one thing and tomorrow you have a different thing. It's a matter of turning around and what they're prepared to go through and recognize that there is this force within this country. But through diligence and application they are able to show the people, eventually, that either these people are going to change or be absorbed or they are going to have to change. In other words, eventually the power and strength of those people that believe in socialism, that their leaders through leadership....

Murray: Will change them.

Allan: Are going to change. Now, on the other hand, the elements for that change are there because what has happened is that you have smashed the state apparatus with regard to what existed before. That has gone out of existence because militarily, you have smashed that. Now what you also have done is you have replaced the protection of what has in the past been protected by the armed services, the police force, etc. Now that apparatus is in your hands. And now you also have got a majority of the people who represent either a peasant class or a working class who now are prepared to see those changes. But take these other elements, recognizing that there is a place, and probably for that particular stage, it must exist that way. And I think that this is where to apply it, let's say, to northern Saskatchewan. It is idealistic to think that we could have changed...

Murray: To create a socialist northern Saskatchewan.

Allan: That's right. We could've. It may have been a state within a state but what we'd have to do is superimpose until the people here are ready to take those things into their hands. And they may, even on the community level, do things that you would look at and say, "My God, why do they do that?" But if it represents some move that the people want on a majority basis, then you have to accept it. You have to accept that idealism. Now I think in going back and applying, this is probably one of the weaknesses of most - well, probably more of Malcolm's because Malcolm thought that it was so apparent that people should see immediately. And what had happened is that he and Jim Brady and Pete Tomkins and the Alberta Metis

Association had been able to make some headway because at the time, when they formed this, there was such a great need for it. People were very, very poor and they were struggling. Another thing is that in their struggle, you want to remember they were dealing with a group of people that had sort of an agricultural background. There had been certain movements within there, that they had been part of.

Murray: The native people, they were different from Alberta.

Allan: Right. That's right. And their experience stood them in good stead. Now what was happening is that he's coming up into a part of the country where actually a people were existing in a cultural area. Well, he did many things that led to other things that people couldn't see. He did economic surveys on his own, went in, fur prices, fish prices, would set these up, would recognize that he had to move. We didn't have the great giant bureaucracy you had to fight your way through at that time because it was something new and vibrant. I think that the CCF wanted to do things and so you could always get to the minister. Today I imagine Joe Phelps would be the first one to admit to many mistakes because of the superimposition of some of these things upon people. Like the Fish Board wasn't

accepted. And the poor fisherman. The fish companies used the people as a tool against the Fish Board because you see, they had made contact...

Murray: The people hadn't created the Fish Board themselves.

Allan: That's right. There was also the fur conservation block area. Now some of this became accepted. Again you could analyze that and look for some of the reasons that it became more acceptable and probably some of the reasons was the fact

that there were a lot of white people had moved in and had taken over lines and these people realized that they needed some protection and the block idea had a certain appeal to it. There was a little bit more democratic approach to it. Another thing is that they had people started this out. And I don't say that these people were so well motivated because basically, I look at these people, they were the types that you would find in Indian Affairs. But they had been here before and had contact with native people and, as a matter of fact, a couple of white fellows that were married, their wives were Indian and they had a certain acceptance by the moccasin telegram. Well here's Bill Tunstead, he lives over at Ile-a-la-Crosse so they knew him someplace over in the east side as well because when he came in he could talk, he knew a little bit better. Not being able to speak the language, he didn't speak the language. But Malcolm was a very articulate and forceful speaker. You'd almost say an orator.

Mrs. Quandt: You either loved him or hated him.

Allan: That was another thing.

Murray: And he was the same with you. You knew pretty quickly how he felt about you.

Allan: Yeah. And a skillful debater. I could see him, I've seen him reduce people...

Mrs. Quandt: Ministers and all.

Allan: Oh, my God, you know, he could cut - I've seen him take Wilf Churchman. Churchman was actually feared. He was actually afraid of Brady and Norris because they'd show him up for an asshole.

Murray: Every time they came into contact.

Allan: Well there were other people.

Mrs. Quandt: (Inaudible)

Allan: Okay. Then the way that Malcolm Norris came is that the government actually sent for him and it was, I would say, through his being known and I would imagine at Joe Phelps's request.

Murray: I'll have to talk to Joe about that.

Allan: You could talk to Joe about that. I tell you the fellow that was over at that was Ahab Spence who is still active in Manitoba. Ahab Spence is still alive. He's in that age group.

Murray: And what was his role?

Allan: Ahab Spence was, at the time when Malcolm was trying to get a native organization going here and that would've been, I would've said in the fifties.

Murray: Early fifties.

Allan: Yeah. What happened is that he had invited Ahab Spence over to address them at the same time. I don't know what they were doing in Manitoba at the time but Ahab Spence today is very active in - I don't know over there what they call it, the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, is it?

Murray: Um, I don't know.

Mrs. Quandt: Manitoba Metis Association, I think.

Allan: But Spence, I know this because I remember seeing him on TV when he was down and they had invited the minister. And he is again very articulate. But Malcolm at the time, you know, indicated to me that Ahab Spence could see this in terms... I don't know if this Spence was a socialist or not but certainly Norris was.

Murray: How long after did Brady come?

Allan: Well, okay, then Brady. Now they were running into some problems with the Fish Board. And what happened is that Malcolm always maintained that you could not run the fishing business without completely integrating it. You had to have a trading service with it, you had to provide trade goods, you had to give all these things. In other words, you had to do just like the Hudson's Bay Company and have all these services available.

Murray: So that nobody got any profit except...

Allan: This is right. And then what you've gradually done, it wasn't on the basis of you started out this way, and that people would work this into either a cooperative... but there had to be... Now here again, you see, and this is sort of the fallacy of approaching this from a socialist point of view and feeling that you could superimpose this upon people. The superimposition is the quiet resistance that was met with. But he said, "Okay, what we have to do is we have to get native

people in here to run these things." And he said, "I can go out and I can get these people." Malcolm said this. "I can go out and get the people so if you're going to have somebody at a

certain northern settlement, you're going to have a native in there running this and these people that I know will be political," he said.

Murray: And Brady was one of them.

Allan: Brady was one. And he said, "Jimmy Brady. We got to bring Jimmy Brady. We have to bring Pete Tomkins." See, so what they were doing is he was just going back into the old Alberta Metis Association and bringing...

Murray: Bringing all the heavies.

Allan: And bringing back these fellows. Now an organizer, you'll never get a better organizer than Pete Tomkins. Pete Tomkins philosophically was, as far as a socialist was concerned, Peter was no great... he was just a great guy. He was a great PR man and he could...

Mrs. Quandt: He could talk to anybody.

Allan: You know, he could charm the pictures off the wall and he had a great repertoire of stories and this type of thing.

Murray: And Brady wasn't as much...

Allan: No, no. Brady was a more serious type. Brady was a very razor sharp mind. His strength and abilities lay in his analysis of a situation. He was a real political animal. He could analyze a situation and he got down to where he was doing

his qualitative and quantitative analysis of situations. And I seen him after he was forced out of the government civil service and go back to Cumberland House and come back and how he would assess the situation and it was just as crystal clear as could be. And Brady was the one that always remarked and said, "Well, you know, when history is finally written, there is always two histories. Histories that are recorded from a middle class point of view and they are distorted by middle class values and so on. Then," he said, "there will be the Marxist history. And the Marxist history will do an analysis of why this took place and interpret it for you and that is eventually going to be the history that we are going to have to be telling to our children because this is going to be the history as it actually happened." And you know, you can see this. For instance, I know as going to school in the U.S., when you begin to look at the civil war and they told you it was over slavery and there was, you know... These are all B.S. things that disappear when you get into the analysis of the situation.

Mrs. Quandt: What year was this that you got Brady in? Wasn't that 1947?

Allan: Well, Brady would have come into, in about 1947 or 1948, something like that.

Mrs. Quandt: It was before we were married.

Allan: Yeah.

Murray: It was a year after, I think, according to what I've heard before but I'm not... about a year, eh?

Allan: And the first I met Jim Brady was at Deschambault and I got on a plane and I was going over there and he was buying fish there for the Fish Board.

Murray: That's where he worked, wasn't it, for the Fish Board?

Allan: That's right. He worked for the Fish Board and he was buying and packing fish. I got off and I made some remark (and Jim was a very reserved individual) and I said, "My name is Allan Quandt, Jim." I said, "I am really happy to meet you. Malcolm Norris told me to greet you." I had a few words with him. Jim had, for a big man, had a sort of a high voice. Especially when he got a little bit agitated, Jim, he would sort of...

Murray: Peak.

Allan: Yeah, it would come up a little. And anyhow, I remember I made some remark about someone within his organi-zation. He had had some real problems at Deschambault and he wasn't getting... Phelps had sent his brother Don over there and Jim was really put off because Don had done something, didn't know the situation at all. I made some remark about social democrats and he picked up on this and I think that was probably the first time that he probably looked at me criti-cally and was sort of saying to himself, "Well, goddamn it, I wonder where the hell this guy fits into the picture. Who the hell is he and what...?" And then after going through there, I had a discussion with Malcolm and I said, "Christ, we can't... a man like that sitting over there, packing fish." Of course, he had operated a cooperative fisheries project over at Lac La

Biche. And I said, "God, we got to try to get him into the department." And so he did and he came in as a field officer and we got him. We also got Tommy Francis - Tommy Francis had been in the same squadron as Henry Petty in the war.

Murray: What was Brady doing first of all in Deschambault?

Allan: He came in for the Fish Board. They brought him in, they'd just brought him from Alberta in. I'm talking like a German now, they brought him from Alberta in. (chuckles) They brought him in from Alberta but when he arrived on the scene there, you see, Malcolm had sent for him and the thing is, what do they do? Nobody had...

Murray: Nobody told him exactly what to do so...

Allan: No, nobody has a clear cut idea of where you're going

to put him either. So what they did is they turned around and, oh, the Fish Board, there's a good place, toss him in there. He had experience and knew fish and fish good. So this is how he ended up there and, you know, you're just wasting these talents. Actually, if they would've got Brady out at that particular time and they could've got him out to just do a political analysis of this whole situation and then recommend some form of political program, let's say for the party, to attempt to try to penetrate this area - what do we do to try to get a political awareness? - I think now, we would have probably been...

(End of Side A)

(Side B)

Allan: ...and some way, shape, or form and he said, because again, I think...

Murray: Was it Mineral Resources that...?

Allan: No, no, this is still Natural Resources. And I said, "Absolutely." And I remember Joe saying, "I don't give a damn whether a man is a Communist or not." He says, "Now I've talked to you and he's your responsibility and I'll hold you responsible and if you feel that this man should be retained..." he said. And that was sort of a probationary period that Malcolm had gone through. Malcolm was very, very outspoken and he scared the shit out of a hell of a lot of people.

Murray: Bureaucrats and that...

Allan: And I wished to hell he'd have scared the shit... I wish that Churchman would have shit himself to death to be truthful. But he used to just cringe. And other people. I related about a couple of incidents there about when Ives made the remark about Jewish people and so on and Malcolm got up. He just challenged. He believed in the frontal approach. Nothing subtle. You knew where the hell you stood. Oh Jesus, he could cut people to... and I saw him do it to Joe Phelps. He did this at a public meeting when Joe Phelps... The whole public, you know, they laughed at this poor - was Stan McAuley. And Stan McAuley was just a shit disturber and didn't know what he was about and he was half drunk and everything but, by God, Malcolm stood up and challenged the minister.

Murray: McAuley was challenging the minister in....?

Allan: Well, it was over a fish. His booze probably was given to him by Holly Davis and his crowd there and he was probably sent there to just disrupt this thing. By God, Joe Phelps you know, hell, he really took off and reduced the guy again. And Malcolm got up and he really reprimanded the minister for this. And the place, in those days, you want to remember now, God,

the CCF had come into power in 1944. This is right after the war. You had things going. Like the box factory had been expropriated from old... Well it does matter, Roberta.

Mrs. Quandt: Oh, Keewatin,...

Allan: Yeah.

Mrs. Quandt: Della....

Allan: Mitchell, Johnny Mitchell. What happened is that they locked these guys out and so the government made a decision. They expropriated this thing just like that and then they had this box factory on. And feelings were running high but the people, the working class people in P.A., were very supportive.

Murray: It must've been quite an emotional time after the CCF was in government.

Allan: Oh yeah, you blame right. And the thing is this you know, that the polarization was so clear. But, at this meeting, well, they were all there, you know, basically supporting the minister, in support of this minister. But here

was this poor Indian and, you know, it was overkill. And Malcolm just took him to task for that and he says, "It doesn't behoove you as a minister of the crown and as a socialist," he says, "to treat poor people in this manner."

Murray: And Joe shut up?

Allan: Well, you know, that doesn't help (inaudible) but I'll say this about Joe Phelps, well Joe Phelps got a real screwing. That's when my feeling of - you got this recorded for history now too - my first feelings about Tommy Douglas and...

Murray: Being a rat.

Allan: Devious little twit.

Murray: I've heard that from another good source too, that he was a real nasty little bastard.

Allan: Yeah. Well, he knew how to use power.

Agnes: One thing I was wondering about Brady, when he left Cumberland House, did his involvement with the government end then? Like he was employed at Cumberland House. Berry talked about all the reasons and...

Murray: Said he worked for a lot of individual people after that, prospecting and stuff.

Allan: Yeah.

Agnes: Do you remember about what time that was?

Allan: When he was eased out of the government?

Agnes: Yeah.

Mrs. Quandt: 1951?

Allan: Pretty close.

Mrs. Quandt: 1951.

Murray: Berry said he wasn't sure how it happened. He said he thought it might be somewhat mutual on the part of Brady and the government, that Brady was pretty frustrated and the government wanted him out as well.

Allan: Yeah, he was frustrated but there isn't any doubt that they engineered this because what was happening was that they were trying to get things on him. At that particular time, one of the things they wanted to do... they had a fellow, an Anglican minister by the name of Parker. Jim had told me this and whether Parker came directly to him... Parker was quite an old - he was quite a character.

Mrs. Quandt: He's still alive.

Allan: Yeah. He was married to an Indian woman and I always maintained when you went in that house, you had to have a compass and a map or you'd never find your way out of it again. My God, was it ever cluttered up. But anyhow, he was one of these types of ministers that go into the north and he's got his little flock and he treats them as little children and so on. Well, anyhow, a guy by the name of Cham McLean who became a northern administrator. The northern administrator at that

time was a fellow by the name of Cham McLean and Cham McLean allegedly went to Parker and wanted to get a whole bunch of dirt on Brady because Brady was living common law with this... You see, in those days, they were frowning on this type of thing. So anyhow, Parker just refused to be part of this type of thing.

Murray: Who directed him to get the information?

Allan: Well, we feel Churchman, yeah, the northern administrator. We feel that the northern adminstrator was doing it directly from Churchman because Churchman now was building his empire, and by now you had Brockelbank as a Minister of Natural Resources. Then you see, what actually happened in there too now, as far as Malcolm Norris is concerned, he switched when this thing really got into a bind with the frustrations that we had met. We could see that these things were going down the drain. The bureaucrats, you know, at that time, they didn't recognize themselves as bureaucrats but the guys that were on the ascendancy were fellows like Churchman, Vern Hogg and these people and they

were gradually coming up in positions of importance and coming through. And they wanted to be apolitical but they were political. They would make a contribution just to maintain and say, "Oh yeah, you know, we're,..."

Murray: Talking about Churchman and those guys.

Allan: Yeah. "We're for you all the way." But there wasn't any other committment at all. So they were gradually building up this power structure and so people were falling off like flies. Well, I quit and different other people went and, you know, the arm was being put on. Eased out or you adjusted.

And what Malcolm did was he adjusted to it and he transferred. They had split the department then and they separated Mineral Resources and they made two departments. And so, he transferred to that department and then he actually was the one that started up the Prospectors' Assistance Plan.

Murray: That was about the same time that Brady left Cumberland House was it?

Allan: I would say and my dates on this are not too good but....

Mrs. Quandt: Well, the reason I know that Jim Brady left Cumberland House was because we bought our first house in 1950 and we were living in the old house the year that Jim came to live with us. And Jim lived with us six months or so...

Murray: In the house you're in now?

Mrs. Quandt: Yeah, we had one bedroom and he slept in the front room chesterfield for....

Allan: He didn't have any employment at all. And it was really bad...

Mrs. Quandt: Any income. And you were working at the fish plant.

Allan: Yeah, it was really hard. The times were really hard.

Murray: What were you doing at the fish plant? You quit DNR at that time?

Mrs. Quandt: Yeah.

Allan: Well, oh yeah, I had quit DNR and we were going into the outfitting business. What we did was we had a partner and we tried to work out where we had other means of income. Like, we looked after the air base here. Floyd Glass became manager of Saskatchewan Government Airways and then asked whether we'd look after the air base there. So we looked after the air base and we were splitting this money up with our partner and then we had a place to live and he had a place to live and then Jim stayed with us and then well, gradually Jim got - I'd got him a

job. We had a school committee at that time. I got him a job as caretaking, just caretaking in the school. Well then, as a matter of fact, he went over and he lived down there in the basement for part of the time that he was there. Then gradually, you know, he did different... He looked after fire fighting because this is one thing that one came to records and that and knowing how to keep records and keep things straight and he did that. And then when mining companies came along, I don't know just when it was when Berry....

Murray: So it was all sort of piecemeal work, eh?

Allan: Yeah.

Mrs. Quandt: He was always very, very broke.

Murray: He was broke even when he was making money.

Allan: That's right. He was always helping people. See, the biggest share of his money that he had gathered together in that frustration he had at Cumberland House was... See, again

the Timber Board was part of this whole thing and again, that structure was changing. A guy by the name of Howard Lukas managed this. Gradually Lukas was eased on out and then we got guys in there that were hard-nosed and so on and they didn't understand the situation. So what Brady tried to get to salvage an operation. We had a saw mill, a department saw mill over at Cumberland House and, if I remember correctly, they shut this thing right down. So what he did is he turned around, he got a private operator in there and...

Murray: The one run by the government.

Allan: Pardon?

Murray: The mill was run by the government?

Allan: Yeah. Then they got another private operator in there. While that private operator was in existence, even when we were there, Joe Phelps had this idea. A fellow by the name of Knutson not related to these fellows, a fellow from Arborfield. Well old Knutson came in there and he just thought that because he was a political supporter, he was going to come in there and use all of our equipment. Because we had a cat and, see, there was a lot of work being done at Cumberland House. You want to remember we started that farm over there. There was equipment there. And also, they had engineering crews in there because they were doing a lot of ditching and diking to maintain levels because that was a good rat area. A lot of conservation work was being done. A fellow by the name of George Munro came up. He was in charge of that whole operation. He was the chief engineer with the water resources branch and they had crews in there. Now, this equipment, old Knutson just came along and thought that he could, you know, beck and call. And like Jim

said to me, he said, "Jeez, I hope you back me up on this

because I said he just can't have it." And I had pointed that out, you know, "You've got to stand on your own." "Well, Joe Phelps invited me in here," and so on and we had a sort of a running battle with him. But anyhow, we were taking a fair amount of timber out of there for the DNR mill that was to be used locally and so on. Then finally this operation was phased out. The Timber Board phased this operation out, the hard-nosed guys got in there again. This other private operator, hell, he was supposed to be using local labor and he brought a bunch of guys in from the farming area, you know. He did use some people and so on, but anyhow, in a way I look back at it and say old Knutson, I sort of feel, you know, he wasn't a bad old guy. But anyhow, Jim started up a program there and sunk his money into a cooperative set up that these guys were producing at that time, pulp. And goldarn it, to look they wouldn't come out and they wouldn't scale this stuff. The money was tied up there and he underwrote a loan and, if I'm not mistaken on this, he actually had formed this cooperative and they had agreed there was going to be monies forthcoming, you see. He was going to get assistance. And they reneged on this and let him hold the bag on this whole thing. All of his money went into it and it all went down the drain. I forget who was with the Department of Co-operatives at that time, Rene...

Mrs. Quandt: Not Argent?

Allan: No, that was before, that other guy. That stocky fellow. I can't remember just the details but I know that's where Jim's money...

Mrs. Quandt: He came to La Ronge broke.

Allan: He came to La Ronge broke.

Murray: This was after he'd quit with DNR. He stayed there for a while and then came to La Ronge.

Allan: Yeah, right.

Murray: What else, Agnes?

Agnes: I just want Malcolm Norris's... I don't know anything about when he was president of the northern Metis Society.

Allan: Jeez, I can't give you that information. I think if you go to the Metis Society here now, they must have some old records that have been moved back and forth. Or probably if you go to, what was the name of the fellow that spoke there, you know, all those brothers?

Murray: How about Frank Tomkins' wife? She's still alive isn't she? Would she know?

Mrs. Quandt: His first wife?

Allan: Yeah, you mean Pete Tomkins' wife?

Murray: Yeah.

Allan: Yeah. She might remember some of these things.

Murray: Where is she? Is she in La Ronge?

Allan: No, no. She probably will move around among her children. She has quite a number of boys and that's the way Pete was doing it last. He moved. One of the boys is down at Brandon and then he'd move up and for a while there...

Murray: He's dead though, eh?

Allan: Yes.

Mrs. Quandt: We received a letter from Pete Tomkins three days after he died and we'd seen him in Prince Albert.

Murray: That was how long ago?

Allan: Oh, this is three....

Mrs. Quandt: Three years ago.

Allan: Three years ago, something like that. Who am I trying to think of, there was, I said, oh, I was trying to think of...

Murray: The boy speaking at the memorial.

Allan: Primeaus, some of the Primeaus might remember. Alec, Alec was the guy that spoke at that thing.

Murray: He's in Prince Albert?

Allan: Yeah. I remember Alec was the one that got up, everybody was really disturbed. There were a lot of white people there and he just...

Mrs. Quandt: He did a lot of lying.

Allan: He just got up there and he absolutely made a, you know, a reverse racist, you know. Now he was talking about the white people and all this. And he was talking about how Malcolm Norris was up there and he had this heart attack and the people came up from government and fired him. That wasn't true at all. Berry may have told you this, but Alec was... I can understand a little bit. Alec, see, he doesn't understand.

Mrs. Quandt: He's a sports jock.

Allan: Yeah. He's (inaudible) the whole Metis...

Murray: So he's a racist or a reversed racist depending on the...

Allan: Well, what happened is, there were a lot of people there that were friends of Malcolm's. The Wheatons were there. There were white and so on, so you know, what purpose is served for God's sake to get up and...

Mrs. Quandt: I do it all the time when I talk about these bastard white people, southern people come up here to the north in DNS. I do the same thing. But what purpose does it serve?

Allan: But at that time, here you were, there were friends of Malcolm's who were paying tribute to him and it was out of place. But then the one thing that he said and there wasn't any truth to it, he says, "And I can remember these two civil servants coming up," and again he mentioned them specifically, white, "from the Liberal government and they fired Malcolm when here he was sitting, you know,..."

Mrs. Quandt: Laying in his...

Allan: Laying at death's door because he had this heart attack and he was left paralyzed on his one side. And so, he goes ahead and he's playing this up. Now that wasn't the way it happened. It didn't happen that way at all. It was an outright fabrication. And further to that, who the hell was it that was running around getting the Liberals elected at that time?

Murray: Alec Primeau.

Allan: You damned right! See, this is the kind of...

Mrs. Quandt: What other question do you have?

Agnes: That's about it.

Murray: What happened to Malcolm's job with the government?

Allan: When the Liberals came in,...

Mrs. Quandt: They had three months or something...

Allan: They had three months to go and they just gave him early retirement.

Murray: But they even forced him out of the Friendship Centre in Prince Albert, didn't they? That's what Berry was telling me.

Allan: Yes.

Mrs. Quandt: Well, the bad thing, they told the Friendship Centre...

Allan: They wouldn't fund it.

Murray: They told them to get rid of him or they wouldn't fund it.

Mrs. Quandt: Yeah. But the one thing that I remember Malcolm - it was just such a frantic time - Mary was raped.

Murray: His wife?

Allan: Yeah.

Mrs. Quandt: She was past 50 and this man came into the Friendship Centre and she was babysitting for Malcolm. And see, Malcolm took on a job, you know, boy, I mean no way did he do a half-assed job about anything. And she was raped and he beat her. He beat her, broke all the bones in her face, and she crawled out. She had a woman's undergarment on because Mary was a very well-dressed, well-groomed woman. She was a beautiful woman and she kept her style. And he just tore her apart. And she crawled out of the building and she crawled down River Street and people didn't help her. And she crawled up the police steps on her hands and knees. And Malcolm and his two sons just about went out of their minds.

Murray: The police helped her, I presume.

Mrs. Quandt: Yeah, a hospital immediately and they had a police guard on the door. And Malcolm, you know, he loaded up a couple of rifles and he took his two sons. I don't know what he thought he was going to do.

Allan: No, but you know in circumstances like that, you don't...

Mrs. Quandt: He just went out of his mind. Here was his, you know,...

Allan: And the worst of it was that the fellow was a native.

Murray: They caught him did they?

Allan: No, never.

Murray: She didn't know who he was?

Allan: She couldn't, see, this was just...

Mrs. Quandt: She was unconscious and she was so badly beaten up. Orval Drew, the doctor, was a close friend of ours and a close friend of Norrises and he just wept when he saw this woman. Every bone in her face was broken.

Murray: She never recovered emotionally I suppose from that, eh?

Mrs. Quandt: Yeah. Mary was a strong woman.

Allan: Yeah, I'd say that Mary is a... you know, she has seen so many things....

Mrs. Quandt: No, she's on a farm in a small town, I think.

Murray: Oh, is she?

Mrs. Quandt: I have an address but I don't write to her.

(End of Side B)

(End of Tape)

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ALLAN QUANDT

Allan Quandt has lived in northern Saskatchewan for over 30 years. He was an active member of the CCF and ran as a candidate in the 1960 provincial election. He was a friend of Malcolm Norris and Jim Brady.

HIGHLIGHTS:

- General problems of implementing programs in the north.
- Growth of the bureaucracy within the CCF.
- Education in the north; what went wrong.
- Development of a fish marketing service.
- Reorganization of fur marketing in the north.
- Establishment of government stores.

GENERAL COMMENTS:

In this tape, Quandt talks about the original excitement and progress in the north under the first minister of DNR, Joe Phelps; the gradual entrenchment of conservative, professional bureaucrats from 1949 onwards - the disappearance of democratic, people-oriented policies. He describes the failure of the education initiative - its disruptive effects. He explains the government's initiative in the marketing of fish, fur - the reaction of private enterprise and of native people to the programs; the establishment of the government trading posts to complement the marketing services.

INTERVIEW:

Murray: I am talking to Allan Quandt of La Ronge. Allan, you came into northern Saskatchewan or Prince Albert in the beginning in the mid-forties. Could you tell me when exactly you came in, what brought you to Saskatchewan and what your first position was with the CCF government?

Allan: Well, I came to Prince Albert in the fall of 1946. And at that particular time, I had been in contact with the minister of Natural Resources, Joe Phelps, and he felt that he required as many young people coming into the department to work on northern Saskatchewan to give to this area some of the changes that the CCF actually were committed to in their political program. And I worked, first of all, in doing a survey into the potential of farming in the Cumberland House area. That was the first job that I did. I went down there and stayed down there for quite a considerable period of time and then, after this report was made, subsequently worked into the administrative setup which was just coming into being.

There were very few representatives prior to that in the whole northern area which is certainly more than half of the province. And they felt that they had to get field personnel into these areas to implement some of the programs that they had committed themselves to.

Murray: So they were looking for progressive people basically

to implement progressive programs? Was that part of their search?

Allan: I think that was part of the philosophy, that they wanted to get people who were committed to the area, to the proposition that the people in northern Saskatchewan, who were mainly of Indian ancestry, had been in an exploited position and that they were addressing themselves to some of these problems and they were determined that they were going to change these. This came about in several different ways. The thing of resource development came into being. Some of the basic resources like fish and fur and timber policies were greatly changed. Sometimes in looking back on these programs, I feel that we made mistakes in that they were superimposed without the necessary awareness on the part of the people just what we were attempting to do. But basically the programs were correct.

Murray: From other people I've talked to, including Gus MacDonald and Phelps, it seems that the government did make attempts to do that, to go out and explain programs to people. Could you describe those efforts and why they didn't turn out to be sufficient?

Allan: Well, I think that probably the main fault is that programs can't be explained in isolation from politics. You have to explain problems as they relate to you personally and in political terms. And this, of course, is to me the failure of this type of thing. Now, probably if the CCF had been strong enough to send people out on the political basis to explain these things, then probably we could've gained the confidence of people. But people have to understand the process of exploitation before they can rise to correcting that particular problem. This is one of the things. You just can't simply go out and explain a program and say, "This is being done on your behalf," when you have been tied to a colonizing process for several hundreds of years. And they identified closely with the Hudson's Bay Company who had provided them certain things. They would come and get services from them and in a way it was almost a sort of a serf-slave relationship. The identification of people to this was very strong because this is where they got all of their trade goods and in lean years, they were carried by the company. And then, of course, the free traders and all of the agitation that these people could raise in opposition to the program was tremendous.

Murray: They would play on this confusion?

Allan: That's right.

Murray: Phelps seemed to me, from other people I've talked to as well, was probably the most, well it's hard to say, progressive minister, in a sense. That he seemed to really identify with the problems of native people. Did he recognize the problem you've just pointed out? That you have to politicize people? Did he see that and not do something about

it? What was his position on that situation?

Allan: I can't ever recall discussing this at length or indepth with Mr. Phelps because he was a terribly busy man and he was a doer. And he did get from the people that moved into the civil service at that time, a lot of dedication. Even people that would oppose Joe Phelps would see the dynamic personality that he was and was prepared to give a lot of hard labor in making programs work. This was at the civil service level. But I don't think that probably Joe saw these things that clearly at that particular time. I don't think that any of us really saw this at that particular time. I think it's only in retrospect that you are able to view these things properly and see where the mistakes were made.

Murray: What was the atmosphere like working for DNR in that time, in those first couple of years when Joe was minister? Was it a pretty exciting period politically? Did people feel pretty positive about what was going to happen?

Allan: A tremendously exciting period of time because people felt that something was happening now. Where you would've had, let's say, a vote in many instances, a protest on a political basis had brought the CCF to power, particularly in the north. Northern people recognized that some of the old representatives here were, you know, were just pulling off the old boondoggle thing. They were there for their own benefit and so on and they were prepared to toss them out. We had a fellow by the name of Les Lee that became the member in this particular constituency. On the west side, Marcene Marion was returned as a Liberal. But in that instance of Marcene Marion, I think people recognized what he was as a politician but there were the powers that existed there that were extremely strong. Like the support of the church was there and it wielded a tremendous...

Murray: That was a powerful force, eh?

Allan: A powerful force.

Murray: You mentioned in the conversation we had before that Phelps had got a dirty deal at some point during his political career. Was that the election of 1948 that he lost and could you elaborate a bit on that?

Allan: Well, I think that because of the stands that he made in implementing programs where we really challenged the normal authority of some of the middle class institutions and private capital, I think because of this probably, in his own constituency of Saltcoats, he was defeated. And I feel that he was treated very shabbily after that by the CCF hierarchy. I feel that here was a man who had given a lot of time of himself and certainly that's vindicated today because Joe Phelps still today is giving a great deal of his time in progressive causes. Now, particularly with the senior citizens, and he has always called for challenges to the status quo. And many people look upon this as, well, moving too quickly. This is the neat pat way of saying... "They want to move too quickly and we have to

stay in power. If we don't stay in power we can't do anything." But finally you've compromised yourself to the point that now, staying in power, you just become another political party.

Murray: So he was looked upon with some suspicion by other cabinet ministers as well as the party?

Allan: Oh, I think at that time, we were beginning to sort out the people who were really committed to a form of socialistic

development. You know, even along the lines of so-called 'social democracy.' And I think that the people who were the moderates and the people who were on the right of the party could exercise these pressures and as I say, the party hierarchy, people were beginning to scramble for their own little particular niches in the power structure.

Murray: When did that start happening? It was really an exciting period but obviously things started to get less positive. What period was that would you say?

Allan: Well, I can't recall exactly, as far as dates and time are concerned, but I know that we came up to La Ronge in 1949 and I resigned my position from the government because it was very obvious in the civil service at that time, once we changed our minister. When Joe was defeated and then J.H. Brockelbank took over, it became quite obvious that certain forces within the civil service structure who sort of stressed the apolitical line and doing a good administrative job...

Murray: A mutual administrative civil service.

Allan: Right. And you know, becoming acceptable to people. And were always quick to point out some of the faults that existed and rather than turn around and grapple with these on the basis of again taking them back to people and informing people, they were quick to change the policy to satisfy the forces that were existing, entrepreneurial forces.

And there were things, the changing of the compulsory marketing of spring fur was one, because of the loud voices that were crying about the poor trapper and how he had to wait for his money and all of that. This is the argument that was being

used but basically it was the argument from the free trader and it was the argument of the company, the Hudson's Bay Company, that wanted to get back this lucrative force again in their hands. Now, in some instances again, being fair, we realize that if people extend credit, they have to secure this and this is part of the securing of credit. When you give a man some credit, then he brings the fur back to you. Now, this was gone and it was a disruptive influence in the pattern of the fur trade. It was a disruptive thing when this was changed and you had the fur marketing service which brought about a better price structure and returned more to them. Then on the other hand, we also did at that time, bring into effect quicker field

payment. There were field accounts set up. People could get an advance up to a fair proportion of the value of the fur right in the fields through the department of Natural Resources...

Murray: Before it was even marketed?

Allan: That's right. And then second payments were forthcoming and this is the way that you turn around and react to a situation like this. Get something in its stead. But again, because of the people vying within the department and pointing out all the problems that exist - because when you solve one problem, another problem comes to confront you. And you don't back off of that, you try to solve that problem and you keep going. This is really what the whole process is about. If you are going to change man's lot, you have to look for problems and be prepared to solve them and go on because other problems come up.

Murray: Was that Phelps' sort of approach to things do you think?

Allan: I think that Joe was prepared to grapple with these and probably, if he would've been returned as a minister, I think that in some instances we would've been able to have gone on because there were many things that, as they arose, you always had his ear and he was prepared to make changes. And changes that he would have to go back to cabinet and justify.

Murray: He was prepared to listen to people in the north?

Allan: That's right. He was prepared to listen and he made numerous field trips also.

Murray: This change in the bureaucracy, did that more or less coincide with Brockelbank coming in? Was it a distinctively different attitude on his part or could you tell?

Allan: Well, I think that it's something that happens to all political parties. You know, you can get any political party coming into power and the old cliche of 'a new broom sweeps clean,' for there is haste to grab this broom and just take wide swaths with it and you're bound to hit part of the target. But then gradually, the entrenchment takes place and then you're right back in.

Murray: The broom gets worn out.

Allan: Yeah.

Murray: So it was a sort of natural historical process almost?

Allan: Yeah. I think it happened in a lot of other departments, you know. It wasn't just this department it

happened, but certainly from where I was, from my position, I could see the forces that wanted to withdraw and just become a

civil service structure that administered services.

Murray: Stayed away from political kinds of questions.

Allan: They would stay away from that and they would stay away from challenging the position of the entrepreneurial strength in the north.

Murray: Right. Would you say that by 1950 this was the trend? To reacting quickly to those kinds of pressures? Was it that quickly or was it later than 1950? I'm just trying to get an impression of the year.

Allan: Well, I don't know. There were still some changes made under Brockelbank. There were certain changes in mineral legislation but I think at that time, I can't remember just when, the Department was split because the mineral development or the administration of minerals and mining in the north also came under the department of Natural Resources and then there was a split made where the minister remained in charge of the two departments and there was a separate deputy minister. Because, if I remember correctly, at that particular time, Churchman became the Minister of Natural Resources and I think Vern Hogg became the Minister of Mineral Resources of...

Murray: The deputies, yeah.

Allan: Yeah, the deputy rather. And before that, Vern Hogg was the Deputy Minister of Natural Resources as a whole.

Murray: Right. Could you describe a bit of the history of the development of the bureaucracy in DNR? In the beginning in the north, it was a very small number of people, is that accurate?

Allan: Oh, there were very few people in the structure prior to the change in 1944. I don't know exactly what the structure was at that time. See, I come back after the war and came into it in 1946 and at that time they had already set up a structure of what they called northern district. We have, or we had within the department of Natural Resources, I think five natural resources administrative districts. There was northern district; Floyd Glass was the superintendent of that district. Floyd Glass which now is present owner of Athabasca Airways. And then there was the Meadow Lake district and the Prince Albert district and the Hudson Bay Junction district at that time as they called it. (I think they dropped the Junction off since.) And then there was the southern district which fell to a line south of these areas. And in the northern district, recognizing the potential there was and need for change and need for justice, certain things happened. There was a fresh water fisheries commission which took place to investigate the fresh water fishing in the north and what could be done to make this a viable industry. And subsequently there was a forming of the Saskatchewan Fish Board as a marketing agency and...

Murray: These were all part of DNR were they? I mean,

responsibility...

Allan: Right. And then there was the Timber Board, the Saskatchewan Timber Board was formed. Mining stayed on the basis of the entrepreneurial approach where these people came in with Riskette who did the investigating through prospecting

and then some had company prospectors. There was a development at that time which Malcolm Norris was instrumental in, the development of a scheme called the Prospectors' Assistance Plan. We got people out on their own and they paid for aircraft travel and certain other expenses, put people out in their field. Then they could make whatever deal, if they came up with any prospect, if they went out and found anything, they could make whatever deal they wanted to with any company.

And then there was a division also in the northern district at that time, they started an aircraft branch of the northern district. And a lot of the fellows that had flown in the war had come back and they were field officers in their own right and they flew. There were forestry patrols and there was the picking up of fur and finally we worked to establish post offices in the north. Contacted the federal government, this was brought into being. And then it was deemed that probably this should be made into a crown company and then Floyd Glass became the manager of this crown company and became Saskatchewan Government Airways. And northern district went on as a resource district.

They also implemented at that time, Joe Phelps also had visualized local government and they brought in an administrator by the name of Joe Wheaton and Bill Bague was secretary to him. And they, in essence, were looking at the same thing that we have got now through DNS which is the Northern Municipal Council. He felt that this would function as a sort of a large municipality where people eventually would be working on the local basis.

Murray: But that didn't get established at that time?

Allan: You can go back and see when it was formed and brought into being. And they were trying to bring this about and promote this approach. And, as I say, Joe Phelps was defeated and the minister, J.H. Brockelbank, that took over after that, there was a gradual sort of, the structure, the bureaucratic structure began to, you know, become....

Murray: Heavy.

Allan: Yeah, more visible, a higher profile. And you're into the thing of...

Murray: Red tape and....

Allan: All. Where gradually the programs that were designed for people and people participation - and I admit, were superimposed in most instances - but rather than correct that,

then we went the other way where you turned around and you backed off and you went back into where the center of power was in the bureaucratic structure. The flow charts were pinned up on the wall and all the lines of communication had to go through the proper channels and when you give up the idea that people should participate in something, well then you are into a real bureaucracy.

Murray: So the people-oriented atmosphere of the department gradually just disappeared into the early fifties.

Allan: Just disappeared.

Murray: I remember there was a report done by the Centre for Community Studies that characterized the north. This was done, I think, about the mid-fifties, maybe mid- to late fifties, characterizing the north as being very similar to India under British colonialism. That a lot of the field officers had the same kind of power as a colonial officer. Could you describe the kinds of power they would have over native people in the north and how that developed?

Allan: Well sure, I think that they had that kind of power and that gradually that power was strengthened and, knowing a lot of these fellows, and a lot of these fellows are friends of mine and many that have retired, I don't think that they ever assumed this kind of power. They identified with people and tried to help and we really had a good spirit that existed among a lot of the field officers in that they definitely were going along once they were sold on a program and an idea. There was resistance to it but once they could see this, and I don't think that that existed with a lot of the fellows. Well, when you begin to take fellows who actually were in the department, who had come from backgrounds of trapping and sort of a rugged frontier life, they identified with the country and they identified with the people. Well when you look at some of the guys that would take dog teams and go out and hit these fish camps and would travel up a lake. I know Frank Clinton, who was just dumped in as the winter freeze-up was taking place. As a matter of fact, the aircraft had to break its way through the first ice that was forming on the bay. And he was just dumped off there with some supplies and dogs and he had to build his cabin, prepare for the winter, and then go up the lake on the first ice. And he just took a map, all he had was a map. And hit all the fish camps, you know, to say that he was there to look after their needs. Sure, collecting

licenses and so on, and enforce the regulations but mainly by way of assisting, you know. That, and you know, radio communication and...

Murray: So the people in the field were pretty good people as far as you were....?

Allan: I feel that there existed a nucleus for bringing programs about that could've been people-oriented programs, you

know, and that there wasn't the matter of a heavy hand. But gradually this too changed and from the way I view it, you know, in the years that I've now lived in the north, which has been thirty years, I view these things always moving more and more into a bureaucratic external force, superimposed....

Murray: Technocratic sort of goals.

Allan: Right. I suppose the saddest one of all is education, you know. I just feel there has been a failure from the time that the Piercy Report was brought down and it was decided that public education should be brought to the north. I can see no good coming out. Nothing but things that have acted to the detriment of people. I'm speaking now of native people. I don't say that it hasn't assisted people who live in the white culture, but certainly it has had a very devastating effect on people of Indian ancestry.

Murray: Could you elaborate on that, the whole education aspect and what the Piercy Report had suggested and where education went wrong?

(End of Side A)

(Side B)

Allan: ...pursued and will have to be pursued in the future. You know, when you look at the Department of Natural Resources now and the types of programs that they are implementing, they aren't taking these things into consideration. And the thing is that, therefore, they are going to be faced more and more with the problems of people gathering in urban areas and becoming a problem because there is no economic base. You have situations that exist in northern settlements where there are several hundred young people now under the age of 20 who probably have a grade four or five, six education. No skills.

Murray: They don't go in the bush, they don't...?

Allan: No, they don't. Where do they go?

Murray: Right. Getting back to the earlier years, was that problem of education, the disruption it caused, I mean it must've been seen by people, what was the response by people like yourself and people in the department to that? Did they try and solve that? What did you see at the time as a possible solution to it?

Allan: Well, I have to admit at that particular time that I felt the whole education process, and this is a cliche again, they say that education is the key to our changing the world. And it depends upon what kind of education, you know. If you were going to go blithely along and teach so many engineers, you're going to graduate 400 engineers, and you only have room for 200 to be employed, what do you do with the other 200 and so on? Unless you address yourself to the problems as they

exist in total - and mainly, again, this becomes a political problem. And I think that we, in middle class capitalism, we realize that the exploitive process, and the process in the north particularly, is one of colonization. And the education has never taken on the aspect of where you want to identify through the educational process to these people what has happened to them, what is happening to them now, so they can respond to this. That isn't told for very obvious reasons. Because then, sometime in the near future, all hell would break loose, because they would demand that things change.

So at the particular time, you say, what did I think about it? Well, I had long talks with Chet Piercy and I was sold on the idea. I could see it. Obviously, you know, when you have youngsters that can stay at home, nobody likes to be separated from their family and so on and I thought that it seemed like a good idea. But after it once was implemented, it was only a matter of two, three years, you could see that there was huge gaps in this thing that had to be filled in and it just wasn't going to work.

Murray: It just hadn't been seen ahead of time.

Allan: Right, right, it wasn't thought out. To give you an idea, I went recently here to a community over on the east side of the province, Sturgeon Landing. I don't know what order it is that had a Catholic school there but they had upwards of 200 youngsters staying and they came from a number of different spots in northern Saskatchewan. This whole school complex was almost self-supporting from the production angle, from the agricultural production in that area. There are fields there now that have grown up with grass, I don't know how many acres that they had tilled at that time. But they had cattle, they had chickens,...

Murray: This was in the forties, was it?

Allan: Yes, this school burned down. Ah, it seems to me it was 1952, if I'm not mistaken, when the school burned down. But they had it well-organized. The youngsters went there and the whole community would, you know... For instance, the boilers were wood burning boilers that they heated. There was central heating. And they had their own power, their own electrical power. But the thing was that the community were, there was an agricultural pursuit. People had vegetables, people had produce and so on. Now you would think that somewhere that this process could be carried on on a community basis and every community in northern Saskatchewan could do this, in addition to taking the natural resource development in the area, basic natural resource development. We don't have to go to the sophisticated things like mining resources, large scale wood resource development, or water power development, but just getting down to the fish and the fur and the tourism in the area and doing things for themselves on a community basis instead of the entrepreneurial basis. Well, in a way here, the church was the nucleus in this particular instance. The church

was the nucleus and one can say, "Okay, they comprised the force." As long as the people identified with it, fine. You know, I think that these are decisions that people have to make when it comes to what they want to do for themselves, and if they identify this closely with the church and there isn't a blatant disregard for human rights in here, fine.

Murray: It's a pretty positive operation.

Allan: It's a positive operation in that it was achieving certain good things, certain good goals. Now, we don't see any

of this go on. Well, even here in La Ronge, the Anglican church had a school here and you can still see the influence of the people that went through that school. I've talked to a lot of them. Sure, a lot of them spoke about some of the things that they didn't like. They felt confined, and a lot of them tried to get away and did take off to go home. You address yourself then to how to make an organization like this a concerned organization where you don't use the repressive measures in trying to keep young people in the system.

Murray: You maintain the positive parts but try and get rid of the negative.

Allan: Right. And when you get back to education here, you know, we are building many marvelous schools but basically, I have to say that the people that benefit out of the schools are the people who become the teachers in there, that go into northern settlements, who have now very nice housing and very, very well looked after, live in a sort of a little ghetto of their own creation.

Murray: Isolated from the realities.

Allan: Isolated from the realities of the situation of the youngsters that they are teaching.

Murray: What about curriculum? That must've been a problem as well and probably still is.

Allan: Well, I think that they took curriculums that were pretty basic to a southern school, you know, at the same grade levels.

Murray: Right. Woodrow Lloyd was Minister of Education; he must've been involved in a lot of this. What seemed to be his response to the education problem?

Allan: I always found Woodrow Lloyd a tremendous person and I think a person that probably understood, you know, really better than any of the premiers that we've had within the CCF or the NDP, the problems that were present and tried to address himself to changing these. And I'm not just speaking of northern Saskatchewan, but to the province as a whole. And I must honestly say that I didn't come to any real discussion on this up here at that time - just didn't have the opportunity.

I know that I have had several discussions with him on northern problems generally and I know that we touched on education and I know that he could see that many of these things were wrong. But you want to remember that when he took over, that so many things had happened, and the entrenchment, and the bureaucracy has a way of perpetuating itself and hanging on. Political leaders, you know, have to be very astute and have to be very convincing, have to be able to get people in key positions to be able to do things. Otherwise, you know, they'll kill you every time. The bureaucracy will kill politicians every time. I think this becomes more and more apparent. I think that there are so many things today that probably the people at the provincial level, and certainly at the federal level, would like to bring about but they're...

Murray: Stymied.

Allan: They are like the giant that's tied down by the threads of the Lilliputians, you know. They get to be helpless giants. Plus the fact that there are a lot of people calling the shots

from the outside because middle class capitalism perpetuates itself through this system.

Murray: Let's get back to some of the programs that were developed with regard to resources in the north. Could you give a bit of an idea of the fish marketing system and perhaps the kind of thing I was thinking of is the original intention and sort of the reaction of the fish companies, that kind of thing?

Allan: Oh, the Fish Board, the original Fish Board really drew a reaction from the industry because the fish industry was a very close-knit industry that was controlled in the large market areas in the United States because the flow of fish down into these areas got down to very few hands.

Murray: So you weren't dealing with just a couple of little companies?

Allan: No, you're not dealing with a couple. There were some giants and it's a real jungle, it's a real jungle. And particularly with the restrictions that the industry had in getting fish across the line. You were dealing with, at that time, A and B fish. Fish that had a tolerance in the white-fish of a certain parasite count and before you could get them in as A fish and then the rest would have to be filleted. And the thing is that if the right people were contacted at the right time, I repeat from people that were in the industry from a long time, if the payoffs were made in the right direction, certain people could get fish across and they found their way and other people would get their fish bumped at the line through inspection. So you had this whole thing to fight plus the fact that as you backed this up right to the lake, now the

fish buyers had ties with these people and the fish buyers that used to go out, would have to, in many instances, would have to

supply equipment, would have to extend money and so on. So it really had the fisherman in a position of not being able to do anything. They either market their fish through the individual that was backing them or they just wouldn't be able to survive. And then the other thing is that all the rest of this existed, of course. The price of the fish in the lake was almost incidental. All these other things had to be paid for and it was the fisherman that always suffered at the end and very often, if it was winter fishing and the year was bad, a lot of the fish wouldn't even be purchased at all.

Murray: What did the Fish Board attempt to do to confront that sort of problem?

Allan: Well, they started out by acting as an agency where they said in certain areas, certain designated areas... There were certain areas that were free here too, where fish buyers could go in and also there were certain areas that they deemed that inadvisable. It would have been a sort of a serious disruption of a normal flow. Well, say for instance if a certain company would have a filleting plant in an area and then all at once someone is allowed to disrupt this, you had to have a flow of fish into that filleting plant. You couldn't very well turn around and let buyers come in and just sort of pick off A fish, because the person would have to have sort of an integrated operation to assure that this was going to work. And what you were doing really then is, in many instances, you were accused of allowing this person to operate because he now was sort of a friend of the government. This caused some disruptive thing. For instance, on the west side, you know, Len Waite operated there. He had a filleting plant at Buffalo

Narrows and of course, everybody said, "You know, it seems funny, Len Waite can keep on operating and the government goes into these other areas." Len Waite had a filleting plant and well, I would say this, quite early on Len Waite was prepared to make the policy of the government. He was prepared to go along with it while others fought it bitterly. You know, did everything, through everything. Well probably that may have been clever politics on the part of Len Waite. They're still in existence over there today although his son is acting as an agent on behalf of the Fresh Water Fish Marketing Corporation which is now a federal agency. And that sort of was the beginning. And the whole idea of marketing fish through a central agency as we know it, within the type of economy we have, is quite sound. It's being used on agricultural products and that really was what the Fish Board was trying to do. Now, it gives you control over a certain volume of fish so you're able to go down to the Detroit buccaneers that operate in fish and have the final say and you can turn around and in many instances, if you have a good lake area and they want to get a certain amount of fish like trout or they want to get some nice A whitefish, you then turn around and you can say, "Well, look it, you take so many of our other fish too, otherwise you just don't have access to this." So it gives you a little...

Murray: So it gives you power.

Allan: Yes, it does give you a certain amount of marketing power.

Murray: And that did result in better prices for the native people, did it?

Allan: I think that what it did in many instances, it brought a little bit more stability. I don't say that it brought back an alleviation of the fishing industry itself right at the ice level because the people at the ice level are going out under terrifically hard physical conditions. You are out there in below zero weather, chiselling basin holes and running jiggers under and setting this all in these sub-freezing temperatures. So this isn't easy. Now, a lot of people like it and I've done it and I can say that the experience was tremendous. At the time, it's damn hard work and it's suffering. I don't give a damn how you want to look at it. Now the thing is to return to this person something that is fair and equitable for what money he has invested and what effort. That has never been equitable. That whole industry has been riding on his back. And you begin to look, and that's right, you got down to the primary producer today and this is still in existence. It's in existence in your agricultural economy unless you get that large that you are able to now have such quantities of money, equipment, and land at your disposal, but for the person that is down there on the family farm level and that, and the swings up and down, this exists and this is this much tougher.

Murray: How did the native person respond to the development of the fish marketing system? Was it a positive response?

Allan: I think that what they really did was they responded in many ways like they did to a lot of the other things. Well, look it, this is something that the white man's come along and he says it's going to happen and there wasn't any resistance. With some people there may have been some agitation, some people were more vocal, but a clear understanding of the situation I don't think was really ever there. And it gets

back to, again, we can't look upon this today. All kinds of things have been done to try to make fresh water fishing a viable industry, and nobody seems to be able to do it. And I don't think we will be able to do it as long as we go on the basis of, it's got to be a dollars and cents thing. Miles of transportation from here to the huge fish markets which are basically across the line and the thing is that until fish is looked upon as a protein food that is required by some individual who is hungry to sustain him and that regardless of what the hell the cost is to get, the cost has got to be forgotten about.

Murray: Until the fish is three dollars a pound, the fishermen aren't going to make good on it.

Allan: Right. And you see, particularly in an inflated period

of times. When you look now at what I used to buy webbing for, and by webbing I mean the net itself, and the nets were always hung down in Winnipeg. They'd bring in women to hang these nets. The nets used to be hung up here, people knew how to do this themselves. They could take this and tie them into the various mesh sizes. Well then finally from cotton, cotton of course would, if you didn't look after your nets real well, they didn't last too long because they would rot. You get fish slime, you'd have to wash them and you'd have to take real good care of them and dry them out. But when you look at your floats now, your floats and your leads and the net itself. And now it's nylon and the side line is nylon and you look at the tremendous cost, the expense that this is, you know.

Murray: And a minimal increase in price...

Allan: And the minimal increase in price.

Murray: The situation in fur was similar. What were the policies in the fur marketing thing? There was, I believe, an establishment of a block system. Could you describe that a bit and what the intention was there?

Allan: Well, the fur conservation blocks came into being. That was another innovation that was done under a joint agreement by the provincial and federal governments. But again, mind you, they had some fellows federally that were pretty well aware of the situation on their own, had some programs going where they challenged the authority of the way raw fur was handled generally in the north. And the conservation blocks were established and within this there was elected councillors. Then people would set fur quotas on spring fur because, see, there was a serious depletion of this kind of fur. Before, there was a very haphazard method and a great deal of bootlegging, particularly in beaver because, as beaver numbers declined and the fur became scarce, well of course, the value of it went up. And the only way they would respond to this was turn around and if there was a given area where there was beaver, they would probably open up a season, you see. And somebody would take this and then again it was depleted. But there were very few of these areas left because they closed the seasons for long periods of time and the value of the fur, of course, went up. Then they would be bootlegged out and would work through the channels. Well, I think again there was an inquiry. I can't quote you the inquiry but one of the foremost companies that operated, Sudacs(?) you know, just stated that they couldn't have stayed in business if they wouldn't have purchased this kind of fur in between seasons.

Murray: Was there an organized opposition to the fur marketing plan?

Allan: Oh yes, there was. Again the free traders were very opposed to this.

Murray: What were their tactics, their strategy to oppose it?

Allan: Well basically, you know, with the company, the Hudson's Bay Company and the free traders, the method that was generally used is that when you would come up to get credit, they would just point out, well, how could they give you credit because the government was taking all the fur. And in most instances, these fellows were also knowledgable in the language, would be able to converse in the native language. I know for years the Hudson's Bay Company had a policy where they gave a man only a certain length of time that he was in their employ and he had to learn the language of the area, at least the basic language.

Murray: So they were very smart as far as...?

Allan: So they would be able to turn around and use this type of tactic. And in many instances, these were used as collection points for spring fur. You know, again I have to say this in all fairness, the Hudson's Bay Company used to have their manager go around with the federal and the provincial representative. We had Bill Tunstead looked after that program on a provincial basis and Hugh Conn was a federal representative. The Hudson's Bay used to go around, Bill and the Hudson's Bay manager would go around, and I would say they were quite cooperative in this. Because already there were some decline in the fur industry as to the monies that were

being made, as to the marketing of raw fur and a lot of it was made on the trade goods. But of course, you could make it two ways otherwise. But they were quite cooperative that way. I think a good deal of the opposition, of course, came from a lot of the free traders because they, you know,...

Murray: It was a political organizing sort of opposition. Just trying to get trappers to...

Allan: Well, I think that when you have a private entrepreneurial approach and people come into a country and the north is always, you know, the north, strong, true and free. You feel that you're free of almost any sort of...

Murray: Regulation.

Allan: Regulations. You turn around and you buy, you sell and you got a license to buy and sell. And it almost gives you carte blanche to operate the way you want to operate. And, as a bureaucracy moves in, there are more and more controls. There is always things that follow that you don't like and, you know, even when a person is dedicated to change, he unconsciously opposes change. He has to always bring himself around to thinking when he sees things happening around and he sees them as something bad, and you have to say, "Well, look. Let's just stop and..."

Murray: One of the other things the government did in this period, this is the last sort of area like this I want to get at, was the establishment of government stores. Could you

describe that from the beginning and what inspired that?

Allan: Well, again, the idea of the government trading stores, Saskatchewan Government Trading as they were called, came about through this thing of establishing certain restrictions as far as the fishing was concerned, where there was compulsory areas, these compulsory areas that fish had to be marketed through the Saskatchewan Fish Board. Now you were into the thing of, who supplies these individuals? He didn't have any control over credit extension anymore. Free trader who used to turn around and do this, he'd have some because he usually was buying fish, he was buying fur and so on.

Murray: He could stop when he wanted to.

Allan: And now, it forced the government into this position of, "Well, how do we respond to this?" For a while, they did it through the Fish Board itself. They got into this, they were sort of backed into it. And as they got backed into it, it became obvious that it created more and more problems. Now, someone, let's say for instance you could take a fish buyer like Len Waite. He supplied certain basics to his fishing industry up there that had to do with fishing and then probably he had private individuals that were private stores and traders and would work in with them. They would supply a certain part and he could probably guarantee back that they would get paid. But here, when the Fish Board got in, because of this opposition and everything, they were really out on a limb. So, gradually, they got into the establishment of Saskatchewan Government Trading and Saskatchewan Government Trading then formed these stores and they actually were separated. For a while, they worked very, very closely. I can't really tell you just exactly when the division was made at that time but that's eventually how they came into being and they existed until such time as they decided to establish these stores on a

cooperative basis. And actually they aren't true cooperatives, they were sort of an ersatz crown company. Northern cooperative trading services were established and they...

Murray: It was a top-down co-op.

Allan: Right, a top-down co-op and it's been always under management and what you did is you had tokenism by way of local boards.

Murray: Right. There was opposition from the managers of the government stores when they decided to change them into co-ops, is that true?

Allan: Yeah, there was some. Again people, you know, worry about their positions and things and so on and I think that there is internal problems and so on.

Murray: They were generally successful though as far as...

Allan: Yeah, generally the cooperative trading services have helped, I think, the northern economy in that there is some local participation. Even if it's on the basis of where there isn't any real power, people did learn the process.

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ALLAN QUANDT

Allan Quandt has lived in northern Saskatchewan for over 30 years. He was an active member of the CCF and ran as a candidate in the 1960 provincial election. He was a friend of Malcolm Norris and Jim Brady.

HIGHLIGHTS:

- The disappearance of Jim Brady and the theories on what happened.
- The CCF party in northern Saskatchewan.
- The single agency concept and what went wrong with it.

GENERAL COMMENTS:

Allan Quandt was Jim Brady's closest political confidant in his years in La Ronge and in the first part of the interview, he discusses Brady's disappearance and death, giving his opinion that Brady was murdered. Quandt was perhaps the only person in La Ronge who was an active CCF supporter consistently over the years from 1949-1970. He talks about the CCF, the nature of the

elections and the attempts to get the CCF-NDP to develop more progressive policies toward the north.

INTERVIEW:

Murray: I'm talking to Allan Quandt of La Ronge. Allan, there is still, allegedly at any rate, a mystery surrounding Jim Brady's disappearance and death in 1967. Could you recall the investigation of that disappearance and the official results of it and what you feel about those official results?

Allan: Well, the disappearance actually was brought to my attention, it came about in this manner. I happened to be working at Otter Lake on some gas equipment or the installing of a tank and Berry Richards came over and said to me that he feared that Jim Brady and Ab Halkett were lost because he had just made a field trip to the Foster Lake area. The area that he instructed them to go to to use as a camping area, which would be close to the mineralized area that they were supposed to be investigating, apparently wasn't in the spot and they had been wrongly located. They had been dropped in in the wrong place and when he looked at the camp, he didn't see any evidence of people being around and so he returned to Missinipe and felt that something should be done by the way of organization of at least a preliminary search.

Murray: There had been a number of days had passed since they'd been set down at this point.

Allan: Yes, I can't recall the exact...

Murray: I think it was seven or eight but I'm not sure.

Allan: Yeah, I can't recall, but the date for his first servicing of the camp was to take place. He had agreed, I suppose, as they do in these types of situations, agree on servicing an area at a certain time and then usually the fellows are back in camp. So, they weren't there and at that time we discussed it and he indicated that he was going to go back to the air firm and suggest that they probably go up. And I think it subsequently followed that they didn't express too much concern and certainly weren't very cooperative at that point and so Berry came back and I think that he engaged La Ronge Aviation. I believe he discussed with Russ Ronning who said to Berry immediately, "Well, sure, you know, we'll go out." So that was the beginning of the search.

Murray: What developed? Was there a large search? How long was it before the RCMP got involved in the search?

Allan: Well, I can't just remember all of the details of it and I wasn't that closely connected with it at that time other than it just happened that I was there and Berry came back and we discussed it briefly. And he had pretty well made up his mind what had to be done initially. Now, after that was done, then Berry, when they had ascertained that they certainly

weren't anywhere to be found, and Berry was able to check at the camp and determined approximately when they were last there, then I believe that he went then directly to the RCMP. Then a full-fledged RCMP investigation started. And I can't

tell you just how elaborate that was. You would have to get that from them, how elaborate. But I do know that they made every effort at that time. The RCMP put members of their own force in and I think they also possibly used other people in the search while they were officially in charge of the search.

Murray: Right. As you know, there is a theory that many people believe that Brady and Halkett were in fact murdered by a Mr. X, if you like. Now, can you recall at the inquest just what credibility that theory was given and how it was viewed by the official search party or by the RCMP?

Allan: Well, I don't think that anything, from what I can recall, happened at the inquest where this theory was brought up other than there was some suggestions of foul play, I think, at different times as they were trying to get down to the facts surrounding the case. But I do know that at one particular point I stated to the lawyer that we had, on behalf of the Brady family, had talked to about handling the actual family's interests at the inquest. And it was pointed out that normally this isn't done at an inquest, at this stage, but it so happened that the lawyer was in La Ronge at that time and while he was there, I know he was sitting right at my elbow and I suggested to him that certain questions should be asked and the coroner did allow this. And also, while the coroner was there, actually the crown had someone representing the Attorney-General's department there and he was assisting in this.

Murray: Do you recall his name?

Allan: Oh, it was, is it Archambault? I believe the name was Archambault. I'm not just certain on that. But the lawyer's

name that I'm talking about, that I had discussed the matter with was Marcel Simonot from Prince Albert. So Marcel asked the question of the RCMP as to anybody else being located on the lake at that particular time because this hadn't come up in the inquest. And at that time Corporal Conrad said, "Oh yes, there was someone else on the lake. There was a party there that had been acting as a guide for Thompson's camps." So there were other people present on the lake, that was brought out. I think also they asked whether they had spoken to these people and he said yes, they had spoken to the people. And also I think it was asked was there firearms present in the camp and I think also they said yes, that there was some type of firearms present in the camp.

Murray: This was in the camp of the other people that were...?

Allan: Yes.

Murray: Right. Was there suspicion at that time that the person involved in this party had killed the two men? I know that there were rumors coming out of that area from the native people. Was that before or after the inquest?

Allan: Oh, I think that that was before the inquest but then you see, a considerable length of time had elapsed. And of course, you know, in a situation like this, all sorts of rumors take place and so that rumor actually was present at that time. But over the years, the rumor has persisted in this one particular direction. And you know, personally I feel that it's unfair to prejudge particularly, you know, when you begin to name names. And it's got that way that actually names are named and that, to me, is very wrong and yet this does continue to persist.

Murray: Does it persist, do you think, because it's so difficult to explain their disappearance in any other way? Is that part of your feeling that it may be an accurate description of what happened?

Allan: I think that probably it is because of the type of disappearance. I know that quite early in the search, while I didn't have anything to do directly, I didn't spend any time out in the field in spite of the fact that I was a close friend of Jim's. My involvement in it was later when we raised money. After the RCMP had discontinued the search, then the search was continued on a voluntary basis and this meant a certain amount of funding. We had to get money for supplies. People went up at no cost but we still had to supply them with food and at that time the search was mainly conducted by Lloyd Mattson who spent the entire summer, the minute school was out - he teaches school - and he spent all of his time up there. He came out of the bush, mind you, he came out of the bush in between, but he went right back in again. You know, there was some organizing to do out here and then he went right back in again with a number of searchers. But actually there was just about a day ahead of his school term starting again and I remember him making the remark to me, "I don't even know whether I've got a job or not." That's how much time he dedicated to the search.

Murray: In his part of the search was it organized sort of by a group and decided by a group that this area should be searched or was it largely on his own that he decided that he would look into this area or that area?

Allan: I think that it was a consensus thing. I don't think that Lloyd, you know, just took... I think that there was group discussion and so on. I can't say exactly but I know that he discussed this with me. We discussed areas that you'd consider searching and I know certainly he did with Berry Richards. And so I don't know. Probably he made some personal decisions in there, I'm not sure about that.

Murray: Can you recall the details of what the searchers

found? Like in the camp, it seemed to me, from my impressions so far, that they determined that they hadn't been in camp long before they disappeared. Is that your recollection?

Allan: Well, it seems from what Berry indicated to me that was true, that they weren't in the camp too long. And probably one of the things there that sort of led to the theory that they were lost, that they were away from the camp, was that it was discovered that they had been put down in the wrong place by the pilot. It was pilot error. And when they were put down in the wrong place, of course, they were going to go out and they had a map. Immediately there would be certain characteristics in the map that wouldn't check out with where they were. So immediately, you know, they would probably want to do a reconnaissance or something. Because the area probably had certain similarities to the area that they were, like a creek running up. One was more of a rushing creek and the other was a slow, meandering creek. The thing is, this would be in their mind. They would go and think, well, here we are, we are here at a certain spot. And it could be quite easy to become lost. Because, you know, if you are departing from a certain spot and you've been dropped there and you've got it in your mind that I'm here and then you....

Murray: They weren't cognizant of the fact they were lost at first, were they?

Allan: No, they certainly wouldn't be. They'd have to discover this at some stage. So this is why I think that there persisted, among a lot of the fellows like Berry Richards and Vern Studer and the fellows that had prospected and so on, would say, "Well you know, what I'd do under similar circumstances." And so they proceeded then,...

Murray: On that basis?

Allan: On that basis.

Murray: What would they have done? They would have gone around to try and find out where they were?

Allan: Well, I would think that they probably would then start to check to see if there are any visible signs of where the fellows had been. That would be such things as blaze marks on trees or broken brush or you know, any number of different ways. Now, I have to say at this particular point that I have never subscribed and quite early in the search, I had made up their mind that there was mysterious disappearance and that somewhere in this mysterious disappearance, there had to be an answer and the first one that comes to my mind of course, is foul play. And I've had this argument, I've argued it with Berry and I still maintain this argument today, that they simply were not lost.

Murray: It seems to me that it would be difficult for two men who are, if they are not experts in the bush, at least familiar

with the bush, to become lost and not identify themselves somehow.

Allan: That was my main argument. My argument is this, that the first thing that comes to mind when you're lost is to maintain your calm and cool and to fight any panic. I've only gone through the situation once in my life and I was lost when I was prospecting and I know what I went through. Now, it was a relatively short period of time. All I had to spend out overnight under miserable circumstances was a night. I was gone a day and a night. That night, when I sat down, I went through everything in my mind and it was just through my own stupidity and not guarding closely enough, my orientation when I became separated from my partner and I didn't have a good enough map at that time. But remembering back the landmarks and everything that happened, I oriented myself and I started back the next morning at daybreak. It was in the fall of the year and it was wet and raining and I was soaked to the skin. Now I, luckily I got back and when I said to myself, "Now, I'm going to break through these willows down at the shoreline here and I should see a claim post across on the other side." And when I came out there, here my partner was, paddling in a canoe looking for me. Now, I was lucky.

Now, putting myself in that position, I thought back of what these fellows would do. Now, I think that after you spend any amount of time there, the first thing you say is you're going to identify yourself to someone somewhere. And to me, that's got to be ax marks, blaze marks, it's got to be a fire, you light a fire. I recall one time talking to an old time prospector here that took Dr. Maudsley into the field here before there were any maps of the area. A fellow by the name of George Gillis. George is still living and they got up on a lake and he got temporarily lost and Maudsley put the question to George, "What would you have done? How'd you work your way out of this thing?" George says, "I got matches," and he says,

"you see that island out there. Well, that island would be a fire pretty damn fast." Now you see, he's thinking ahead and that's one of the ways that I think that they could've identified themselves because there were aircraft flying over that area all the time. And the thing to me is that any kind of a fire....

Murray: Would be reported.

Allan: It would be reported. Or let's say that it would've got down to where they would've felled trees off in. When you look from the air and you look down and you can see along shorelines where somebody has cleared an area. You drop, just drop a few trees down into the water. Or blaze marks. You know, there's several different ways you try. But there was nothing that indicated from the people that searched that outside of, oh yes, they said they saw some blaze marks and then they said that they saw a raft. I know that they said these various things. I admit, I wasn't on the spot, but I just don't...

Murray: None of those things seem to be definitive to you.

Allan: They just do not fit the pattern. Again in arguing this thing, I know that Berry said, "Well, Jim was a very stubborn individual." And he felt that if he got himself into a jackpot like that, he'd work himself out of it. But I said there is one further thing to this. Jim is a very intelligent individual. And there is going to be a point where he is going to turn around and say, "Look, I'm not getting anywhere in this. I'm going to pursue a course where I'll now try to bring all at my command to try to get people to discover where I am."

Murray: Right. And would the fact that he was with another person tend to temper his stubbornness in terms of responsibility for that person's welfare as well?

Allan: Yeah, I don't know. I would think in a situation like that, Jim knew Ab Halkett very well and again, Ab Halkett in his own right was a bushman of wide experience. Both of them were bushmen of wide experience. Again, people that knew them individually would point flaws out. I've talked to individuals that said, "Well, I've been out with Ab Halkett prospecting and, by golly, Abbie could get more confused and he could lose himself." Probably he can, I don't know. I was never out in the bush with Ab Halkett although I spent some time and knew Ab intimately. I know at one particular time that he did a job that I was involved in where he went out prospecting with three other fellows. They did a marvelous job. And he did a lot of prospecting. Not only that, he trapped and he knew the bush. Now the thing is that even if you have lapses of memory and you turn around and you say okay, all of these things can happen, it all boils down to where you've got intelligent individuals and they're finally going to come to this stage of where they are going to say, "Well, look, you know, we've..."

Murray: They are hopelessly lost.

Allan: "We're hopelessly lost. Now we have to do something." And that, to me, is trying to identify yourself to someone else.

Murray: In my thinking of the thing, I put myself in the position of saying well, okay, just for the sake of argument, let's eliminate the theory that they were killed. Something dramatic had to have happened to them in those first couple of days. In your knowledge of the bush, is there any possibility

that something in a dramatic sense, other than just being lost, could have happened to them that incapacitated them?

Allan: Well, you could let your mind, you know, sort of run amok and say it can go to the simplest to the most bizarre. I have heard all kinds of really weird things, you know, from the one where there was foul play, they were done away with; that's the most persistent one. And people even turned around and got

very rational explanations for the way it happened and all. And then you can go to where, okay, fellows were drowned. Now, the drowning thing, the canoe was pulled up and it was beached. Now how would you drown? You'd have to jump into the water. The only other thing that there was at one stage, they said they found what they considered was an old raft. Well, why would these fellows turn around and set out afoot? Now they could possibly do it, I suppose, set out afoot and go out and, because they started from a point that wasn't clearly identified to them because of their being placed in the wrong place, they could follow out there and then not get back to their canoe and then make a raft. And they could've fallen off and they could've drowned themselves. The likelihood of two of them doing that would've been unlikely. Then the other thing is that they say the bears got them. Or the other thing is that you panic and you ran yourself to death in the bush. I've even heard the story that there was supposed to be a UFO dropped in there and transported them, somebody said, "Yeah, they transported them to Cuba." And so, you know, you can just let your mind go and...

Murray: You consider the likelihood of them panicking to be pretty remote, knowing the two men?

Allan: Knowing the two men, I would say that their panicking would be very unlikely, very unlikely.

Murray: Let's get back a bit to the RCMP. Now they did question these two men that were allegedly on the same lake. They dismissed this as being unimportant? Did you think that that was an honest appraisal on their part of that situation? What was their response to the obvious suspicion at least that something, that...?

Allan: Well, they just responded by saying yes, they had been up to the camp and yes, they had spoken to the people and I guess satisfied themselves to the point where they felt that this didn't have any bearing as to these fellows disappearing.

Murray: Was there any detail, as far as you know, regarding when these two men left that area where Brady and Halkett disappeared?

Allan: No, I don't know because I would imagine they may have been taken out of that area for a certain period of time because if they are in there guiding, it could be that they could go back with a plane. Let's say that if there wouldn't have been someone booked into the area, that they could've gone out and then come back again. So I don't know how long they stayed.

Murray: That would be the only way that they would get in there if they were guiding is by plane. It's too far from Otter to go by any other...?

Allan: Yes.

(Break in tape)

Allan: And I said, "You know Lloyd, I've said this all along and I know that you don't agree. I've maintained that something has happened to them that is out of the ordinary. It would appear to me that it would have to be some foul play." And he said, "Look, I couldn't allow myself to think that way or I couldn't have carried on with the search." And that I can respect. I think that he had this in the back of his mind but he cleared it out. Because he kept on. He said, "If I wouldn't believe that we were going to find them, either dead or alive, you know, someplace in the bush..." But he would believe that somewhere they were out in the bush, not as I believed it, there was foul play and...

Murray: They would have been disposed of?

Allan: They would have been disposed of.

(End of Side A)

(Side B)

Allan: I think that was pretty true as far as La Ronge was concerned. I certainly knew people or learned to know people later on that held CCF memberships and had been old country socialists. One of the people that I became very well acquainted with and had a long time standing friendship until he passed away was Bert Vandercraft, who was an old country bricklayer and had come to this country and had joined the Canadian forces in the First World War and came back and came into the north and he always supported the CCF. I also know of people of Indian ancestry. John Bird was a supporter for many years. I worked with John Bird and Bert later on and we didn't have that much active...

Murray: There weren't regular meetings or were there?

Allan: Not really. It was really an uphill struggle and it should have been an extremely good area to do political organizing in. It was lack of funds. It was the lack of really basic support that you required from the south to carry on the program of education, of political education.

Murray: Did you make efforts to convince the party in Regina that that was what was needed and and if you did, what was the response to that?

Allan: Well, I think that at the time when we first moved here, we had more people coming up from the south and we did have a small nucleus of party membership here.

Murray: Basically southerners?

Allan: Basically southerners, right. We had some people here

that supported us from the Indian-Metis community. But things began to take place here that... there was a superimposition of some of the ideas. This, I think, was a fault of all of us that came to work here in the north before we moved into the area and lived here as permanent residents and begin to form an attachment to the area and a commitment to the area as well as the people in the area. I know when I worked in the civil service it was a matter of taking some of the principles of the CCF and, through lack of education, we superimposed these ideas upon people, saying it was in their best interest.

Murray: Telling them.

Allan: Really telling them what they required. And this reacted against us. The thing is that in the next election, I'm not certain whether Leslie went in for two terms but that would be the longest. He was then defeated by a Liberal. And that again was just a reaction to the superimposition of ideas and very much the same way they were fed up with the Liberals. Then they felt that some of the things that were being done were not in their best interest. And of course, election campaigns in those days, there was many forces at work and money flowed quite freely and you could buy a lot of your final results with dollars.

Murray: Could you expand on that a bit? That's an interesting part of the northern history is the nature of the elections. Could you expand a bit on the forces you've mentioned?

Allan: Well, I think that there were all sorts of things come into being where people have got money. Favors are bought. Everything enters into it, all the way from direct small amounts of money as direct bribes right down to the use of booze.

Murray: And what were some of the other things? Promises of jobs? Would there be threats involved?

Allan: There is all sorts of things that take place. Threats, coercion and the idea of where people, particularly people that owned stores, trading interests and this type of thing, because many of the things that were inaugurated by the CCF actually worked against their best interest in the fur trade, in the fish trade. For lack of understanding, people would be told that they would lose things like the old age pension and these kind of things that they didn't understand.

Murray: If they voted for the CCF?

Allan: If they voted for the CCF.

Murray: And there wasn't a large enough organization of the CCF to counter that kind of propaganda.

Allan: It becomes difficult to counter that type of propaganda when people that they had identified with over the years, had

learned to know, and they felt that basically, this individual was telling them the truth because they had known him and...

Murray: That situation was, by 1952, that people had sort of been turned against the CCF government in the north?

Allan: Yeah, I think that you were beginning to get into the backlash by that period of time. It sort of carried on from then although there was again the thing taking place where people would go through this stage of getting their fill of the other fellow too. So then they would revert back again. So we got into a series of where there was an exchange. First you had a Liberal who was a sitting member, Dick Hall. Then you got into Les Lee, then you got into Ripley, and from Ripley you went Harrop.

Murray: Ripley was CCF?

Allan: No, Ripley was Liberal. He came from Sandy Bay. Then you got to John Harrop. And John Harrop came from Uranium City. And then I think it was the 1960 election that I contested as a... we were just into the change of where some

people within the party ran as CCF, some CCF-NDP. That was at the time when the change was coming to the party name from CCF to NDP. So the thing is that I ran in 1960 and at that time, I was defeated by Allan Guy and Guy, as a Liberal, became... oh, I forget how many, I think three terms that he actually was in office.

Murray: Did the CCF party in La Ronge ever get larger than the first few years you've described? Did it pick up a bit after that?

Allan: Oh, I think that of latter years. Finally, following the Thatcher regime, the NDP picked up considerably and for the first time people could grasp what the potential in the north was as far as giving people a completely new concept in government and participation in government. And we had a new program that was endorsed by the party and we gained a lot of support and we got a lot of local membership and we began to get across a real understanding and feeling towards what change could really do for this part of the country by applying socialist principles in a new direction and particularly with the involvement of northern people in their own affairs. The decentralization process, the process of people becoming directly involved in forming a new department, of which they would be part of and they would decide the directions it should go, rather than sort of a civil service structured, bureaucratic structured... They had had enough of this. They had had it in the past, both parties. Now this is a new concept. Unfortunately it hasn't worked out that way because the NDP just reneged on this and they have set up a more rigid bureaucratic structure than ever.

Murray: This was the single agency concept.

Allan: Well, they referred to it as the single agency concept. I think this is the way the present minister always saw it but this isn't really what they agreed to in principle. We laid down certain things that we felt should be followed which was endorsed by the executive and subsequently used as party policy and then it was followed and endorsed by convention. And this is the idea of what we felt was a concept, a new concept.

Murray: It was an anticolonial concept was it?

Allan: Well, it was basically a decentralizing process. It wasn't a matter of just taking all of the various departments involved in the north and putting them into one single agency. True, you are going to have one governing body but there was a central theme that ran through at that time. We said there were certain approaches that could be made but first of all, as the department came into being, that the people that actually would decide the direction that it would go and its form would be that of northern people. Not that of a civil servant or a group of civil servants coming up and saying, "Look, this is your administrative structure, this is the flow chart, this is what's going to happen. Here is the minister..."

Murray: Regardless of how well-intentioned.

Allan: Right. "Here is the minister, here is the deputy minister," and so on down. "Here is your line of control." The thing is that we didn't ever see this idea of even a deputy minister. What we actually looked at at that particular time was that we were going to have something comparable to this idea of... they speak of a northern municipal council now. Well, it's true, they have a northern municipal council but it's powerless. It sits there and the thing is that this

transfer of power is never going to come about. It becomes obvious as time goes on, day after day, it isn't going to come about. We actually felt that there would be either this type of council, which would be elected by the people, or a commission form, again elected by, but a group of people that would actually take their direction from the communities. And we didn't look upon some great giant thing coming into being in a few years where there would be a whole influx of people from the south. We thought that this would evolve very slowly. As people dealt with their problems, they would make them known. You would add staff and the main thing was support, resources support people that would give the expertise if....

Murray: When asked for.

Allan: When asked for.

Murray: When did you start working on that concept? When did that consciousness of what was needed start to develop in the minds of CCF and progressive people in La Ronge?

Allan: Well, I'm trying to think back as to when the Blakeney government took over from Thatcher...

Murray: 1971.

Allan: From 1971. Well, we would've been working on this just prior. The time was very short. What actually happened is they didn't have a northern policy. And there were many of us, because there was just a handful of people, many times our family practically stood alone up here at election time. And the organization was very haphazard and something that was

brought about very quickly. And, I protest, no longer held a party membership. But at that time, you could see this seemed to be the only chance of defeating the Thatcher government and certainly, even when I didn't hold a party membership, I always went out and helped organize and get elections going here and did whatever I could to get organization going in the area. And so there was several evening discussions that I had with Bob Dalby who eventually became the candidate and who was not a member of the NDP but who felt a close attachment to the north. He had lived here for about 15 years. We spoke of things that we felt should happen here to get away from this sort of imposition of bureaucratic power on the people and that we had to decentralize, we had to give northern people a chance to do things for themselves, and to correct some of the ills and that went all the way from the process of the administration of resources right to education, health and all. After coming up with some of these ideas - that time Glen Lindgren was here as school principal and he and his wife had always been a supporter - and we got together and discussed this and actually, there were three people. Now this wasn't too democratic but you want to realize there wasn't an organization anymore here.

Murray: It was as democratic as it could be at the time.

Allan: It was as democratic as it could be. And what would happen is, elections would come along and an organization would sort of spontaneously arise and then we would fight an election. It wasn't well-organized and you might win or you might lose. I know that at Uranium City there was always the union people there who were certainly always on the side of the NDP in an election. Now you always had this group but again, in between, the organization just sort of disintegrated. And in many ways, you know, I feel that, as the party was

constituted, they could've cared less as long as they stayed in power. They certainly didn't listen to you in between when you talked about some of these ideas. But we came to this point and there was just the three of us that actually asked to have this program or this concept aired.

Murray: Who did you convince in terms of the actual people in the power of the CCF?

Allan: Well, we contacted Ted Bowerman, Gordon MacMurchy and Don Farris. I think the three, these were the first three people that we went down and met them. And we subsequently had

one or two meetings and it finally sort of gelled and they listened to this and they thought that the idea was a good idea. The north no longer had, you know, John Harrop had moved from the north. He had been an MLA for years. He was now down living in Regina. They actually didn't really have any organization in the north at all.

Murray: Or any policy.

Allan: Or any policy really. Their resource policy for northern development, they hadn't ever really challenged the position of any of the mining companies. I think that they felt that probably, in the back of their mind, they felt that they were going to have to make some new changes. Now, mind you, there were all sorts of things have taken place since then with regard to, you know, what has happened as far as potash is concerned. And yet they still aren't taking any lessons from that particular type of development and here they are going into an area up here where certainly... When they came into power finally in that 1971 election, we didn't have a mine in northern Saskatchewan with the exception of one crown-owned

mine and that was Eldorado. It was owned by the federal government. And Gulf hadn't come into being yet. I think that was still at the stage of negotiation. They couldn't find out too much information about what the Liberals had actually promised these people. As we presented ideas to consider the share position with Gulf, it seemed that they always came up with ideas as time went on where they were digging these out somewhere and said, "Oh no, well, there are certain things that have already been finalized and we can't do that." Even to the point, at last, in trying to inaugurate a policy on Gulf where they were going to look to employ northern people and to try to train northern people to take these jobs, where even this was falling on deaf ears.

Murray: The concept that you finally sold to the NDP, my impression was that talk had actually begun about that sort of thing back as early as the late fifties.

Allan: Oh, the single agency concept had been going for a long while. Well, actually we can go back to Joe Phelps's time and he was the original Minister of Natural Resources. At that time, they were bringing in a policy of bringing some form of municipal government to the north. They set up a northern administrator, and a secretary and I think that idea of trying to bring more democratic local control already had sort of started. And it went on so far and then there were some changes and as the bureaucratic structure began to change and through the civil service structure, I think that they could see this probably as a threat to their power. I suggest this because I don't know why it wasn't pursued at that time. But it finally just fell by the wayside. I think actually was sort of forced out, the idea. But I know that there was subsequent... I think at one time, I believe Gus MacDonald

spent a short period of time as administrator, if I'm not

mistaken, and I think that he always had this idea.

Murray: He was Director of Northern Affairs. He may have been administrator as well.

Allan: He had this idea that a single agency rather than a series of government departments operating in the north, that they should come under a single agency. So the single agency idea was...

Murray: Was always there.

Allan: Yeah, was present for a long period of time. And I'm convinced today that the now deputy minister or the now minister of Department of Northern Saskatchewan didn't ever see it any differently.

Murray: It was simply an administrative concept.

Allan: Yeah, just an administrative concept. I don't think he saw this as something that was going to be new, to give people power through a decentralizing process where you went back to the community level and that people were going to be able to have certain power to administer certain given areas.

Murray: There was a paper produced by a group in La Ronge, including yourself, about the single agency. That was in the late fifties, was it?

Allan: Well, I can't remember the actual date of that but this goes back to when, I think Olie Turnbull was the minister of Co-operation and I know that we discussed this idea with him at

that time following one of the elections. And again, you know, in the heat of an election everybody is bouyed up and then the election is over and people want to do things right away. Then a period of time goes by and then finally everybody just sort of gets into place and then they forget all these things. I can remember one time we had a meeting here with him and at that time, I think there was Jim Brady was present, Malcolm Norris was present and we had...

Murray: Dalby was present too, or was he?

Allan: No, not at that time. That goes back earlier. But at any rate, we made some of our feelings known about how they just weren't carrying through with this. And I remember Turnbull stomped off in high dudgeon because we said to them, "Look, you just turn around and listen at election time and then after it's all over, then you turn around and just leave us here. It just becomes a bureaucratic structure, the civil servants again take it, there isn't any input from people, and people are fed up with this. And this time the thing was to change. And we'd discussed this before the election and you said certain things are going to be done." And I can remember at that time, it was rather interesting because Malcolm Norris was a very volatile individual and no way would he take

anything from anyone if he felt that he was right. And in that particular instance, when Ollie Turnbull stomped out of the house, Malcolm followed him and said, "Well, look here, I'll give you a ride in the car back to the..." After that we really gave Malcolm hell over how he started kowtowing again to the white man after he had taken that, you know... actually, that was a really prima donna act, you know. My opinion of Turnbull after that thing just fell to zero and I never did change my opinion after that.

Murray: Right. I want to get to Malcolm and Jim's contribution as far as the CCF was concerned but before that, I want to find out what kinds of directions the CCF gave from Regina in terms of, well, for one thing, in terms of choosing candidates. That, I've heard, was a source of conflict between local people and the party headquarters.

Allan: Yeah, this was true and sometimes we really had to sort of assert ourself on the local basis because there was some manipulating. And there has certainly been cases where people have gone out and they did a lot of campaigning, particularly people who were attached to the civil service structure. I know the time when Cham McLean ran, he had people going out, selling memberships and that. That didn't sit too well with people up here who were on the spot and so on. But those wounds sort of get healed when your common enemy is the other political party that you see as the one that you have to defeat. I know at that particular time, for an example, Cham McLean did all sorts of things to try to get Jim Brady eased out as a field officer in Cumberland House, some things that I consider pretty low. And Jim knew this and eventually he saw that he was in sort of an untenable situation and he just resigned. And he stayed at Cumberland and he worked down there, worked with the cooperative that they set on producing wood and cordwood. And at the time when McLean ran, Jim was up here in the La Ronge area and he was caretaking over at Nistowiak. There was a mining company, La Ronge Uranium, that had set up there and was doing some experimental work with ore and it was a radio-active pegmatite type of ore. And Jim had every reason to stay away from the polls or to go out and try and defeat McLean on a personal basis. And he walked all the way to Stanley to cast his vote and I questioned Jim about this

later. I said, "Well, why would you do such a thing?" "Well," he said, "it was quite obvious. It was important for any ordinary citizen at that time," he said, "the most important thing was to defeat Tucker as a threat," who was then running as the leader of the Liberals. And he said that was a force far worse than having to have McLean inflicted upon him.

Murray: So it was a simple political decision.

Allan: It was a simple political decision as far as he was concerned. And he always rationalized on the basis of what was really best for the ordinary person.

Murray: Right. What was Jim's involvement with the CCF during

the time that he was in the north as far as you were aware?

Allan: Well Jim was a socialist and a left wing socialist and his commitment to working people and people of Indian ancestry was never to be questioned at all because he was always solid. And therefore, he saw that the political force that was the most viable political force in the north was the CCF and later the NDP and he always...

(End of Side B)

(End of Tape)

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ALLAN QUANDT

Allan Quandt has lived in northern Saskatchewan for over 30 years. He was an active member of the CCF and ran as a candidate in the 1960 provincial election. He was a friend of Malcolm Norris and Jim Brady.

HIGHLIGHTS:

- Malcolm Norris and Jim Brady: their relationships with the CCF party.

Allan: He tried to convince people that this is the path they should take in their own best interests. This would be trappers and fishermen and northern laborers and anyone that was sort of being victimized by the system in the north. He would point this out to them and then he always, well I shouldn't say always, but he did go down on a couple of occasions as a delegate from this constituency to the annual conventions.

Murray: Would those have been the earlier elections do you think, or can you recall when that...?

Allan: I can't remember. The last time Jim went along as a delegate, I can remember when the convention was held. It was a convention that was held in Saskatoon and I can well remember, you know, when he was outlining... It was one of the elections we were defeated on and I would imagine that probably it was the time when Ripley probably was elected. Because Jim,

in one of the panel discussions, did an analysis of some of the things that caused our defeat, when we should've won because we had the sitting member. And I remember that Tommy Douglas challenged Jim on some of this and Jim just got up and was able to, in his quiet way, just back Tommy Douglas right completely into a corner. And did it so nicely and he had facts at his command. He had the most retentive mind of any individual that I've ever met and he could just quote these facts. He made one little slip in this and, just shows you what a clever politician Tommy Douglas was, and that little slip, Tommy Douglas just took over like that. Jim said, "You know, we lost hundreds of votes over..." because of the reasons he outlined. And Tommy just jumped in like that and just sort of sneeringly

said, "Hundreds of votes." And he quoted the amount of vote that we had in this constituency and it was just a few hundred votes, you see, in total. And used this as a basis for his argument. And that shows a very clever politician, but to me, it, you know...

Murray: It was cheap.

Allan: It was cheap.

Murray: I remember seeing a letter written by Jim in 1953 which, to the person he was writing to, he said that he was completely fed up with the CCF and had let his membership lapse. But he still saw the CCF as the much better of what was available.

Allan: Yes, that's right. Yeah. I think that he was like many of us, you know, that looked upon ourselves as socialists and we expected better performance from our leadership. I think we recognize that there was a hierarchy that held sway in this party and that were always looking to be acceptable and were wooing people at the ballot box. "If we can be in power, then we can do certain things." And then when they got in power, they became more and more entrenched, you know, and the people that seemed to rise in the civil service were people that saw that the bureaucracy became more and more an important part of government.

Murray: Did he take part in CCF activities after 1952-53, as far as you can recall? As far as going to conventions or working on elections?

Allan: Jim would always, if he was there, he would always do what he could. As far as taking part in elections after that now, I can't remember. The last time that we went to Saskatoon, I can't tell you what year that was. That could've been a little later on in the fifties but I would doubt it very much. Probably that was about the last that he would've taken part. Because I remember we went to a gathering where there were several people in Saskatoon, I'm trying to think of the name of the place.

Murray: Naylor's.

Allan: It was Naylor's, right. Because George Taylor was there and - what was the Attorney-General's name at that time? Came from Saskatoon. He was the one that pressed the charges on the Columbia metals thing against Morris Shumiatcher, had sort of a vendetta on with Morris Shumiatcher.

Murray: Oh, yeah, I know who you mean. I can't think of his name either.

Allan: But at any rate, these are the type of people that were there and I know that we had some discussions about the north at that time. There were several people there from the university and I know that when Jim began to do some of his analyzing of the situation that existed, as it related to native people and the colonizing process and all, I know that there were a lot of people who were really impressed because he could hold his own as far as an intellectual level with...

Murray: Any of the academics.

Allan: Any of the academics.

Murray: What about Malcolm as far as his involvement? Of course, he didn't live in La Ronge but what was his involvement in the CCF as far as you were aware?

Allan: Well, I think that Malcolm again always was...

Murray: The same sort of attitude.

Allan: Yeah, very active in the party and always did what he could, and helped to organize. And of course, he was always trying to organizing among the native people to get their own organizations going and I know wherever they got to the point of talking about using political power, he always put forward that the only solution, as far as people of Indian ancestry, the only solution was in having socialism supplant capitalism as a political and economic order.

Murray: How did he put that argument to native people? He wouldn't put it just as you have?

Allan: No. Malcolm worked in so many varied areas in government. He did some economic surveys, took the prices that trappers got for their fur at a free trader or what the Bay was paying and then he would do an analysis of this price against what you would get from the Saskatchewan Fur Marketing Service. He would get fish prices and so on, and he would relate to people how, if they would use these things, it would help them. And if this idea would carry further, the idea of people having control over some of their own resources and so on. But he would try to, by example, show them how they could gain and have a better life and try to do it by grass roots reasoning.

Murray: What was Jim's approach to talking to native people? Would he use the same kind of approach?

Allan: I think that Jim did basically the same thing. Jim believed again by actual doing. He was a believer in cooperatives, in that if people became involved in this to help themselves...

Murray: Then they would see.

Allan: They would see. He didn't believe that, you know, as many people today that support cooperatives believe, that you can have a flourishing cooperative in a middle class capitalism. Jim always maintained that a cooperative could not flourish in its broadest sense only under a socialist state. That he fully believed. He didn't push that idea. He just felt, get people involved in cooperatives and get them involved in their taking part in it so they can see what they are up against. The economics of the thing where they may produce a certain article, that is where they end. They produce it but once they get it out into that market, they are subject to all the other market forces. And it was a learning process there as far as people were concerned. That's the approach he would take. He was limited in being able to identify with northern people, he was limited when you compared him to Malcolm because Malcolm could speak Cree fluently and Jim didn't have an Indian language at his command. He could speak French fluently but he couldn't speak a native language. And this wasn't a deterrent though, as far as establishing contact and being close friends with native people because I think in many ways, he had a closer relationship with people in their lifestyle.

Murray: Felt more akin to the northern way of life than Malcolm.

Allan: Right, than Malcolm did. Malcolm had sort of moved out of this thing. And had gone through, in his younger years, had trapped and prospected and everything and now he lived really a petty middle class life as a civil servant. And that didn't mean that he couldn't go out in the bush and still do his thing. As a matter of fact, it was really sad the last few years Malcolm went out and was looking after the Prospectors' Assistance Plan because he still felt he could go out and he was just as young as he ever was. And it was taking its toll, he couldn't do it. I said, "Malcolm, you can't do those things any more, you know. After all, you're getting up in years." But he tried that hard, he just wasn't going to give in.

Murray: Right, a doer.

Allan: And you will recall then he did suffer more than one heart attack, you know, and left him finally paralyzed, which was a sad thing. But Malcolm could've gone out and survived anywhere in the north. He had that ability.

Murray: Malcolm's lifestyle, you say, was sort of petty middle class, as I've heard it described 'halfway up the hill' in Prince Albert, sort of. Was this just his choice, this is the way he wanted to live or do you think it was in any way a reaction to native lifestyle or was it simply his choice of living?

Allan: I don't know. I never really discussed these things with him. He was a friend and these things...

Murray: Didn't come up.

Allan: No, they didn't come up. I think that, you know, he felt that he wanted this for his family and...

Murray: And of course, Jim didn't have a family in the same...

Allan: No, Jim didn't have a family and again, I suppose, these things meant a little bit more to Jim. Jim, regardless of what position he held in the structure when he was a civil servant, and he was a field officer (now you call them conservation officers), he always identified himself, if he had to be identified, as a laborer. Just because he wasn't going to move out of the working class.

Murray: That's what he wanted to be and that's what he was.

Allan: That's what he wanted to be. He wanted to be known as that. He didn't want to be known as something else. He took those other things, I think, because he felt that it was a way that he would be able to further the end of getting people to understand and to help people in a given area to understand and to give them a little bit more power and the understanding of power and the understanding of responsibility and so on. Because at that time down at Cumberland House, there were a lot of projects going. There was a farm being developed and there was a sawmill being developed and all these things. You get into, you know, some of the Indian cultures where one will not want to give orders to another at all. Jim, in that situation, had to give orders but he minimized them because he'd try to get people involved and would just discuss things that had to be done and there should be a consensus. But if he had to do it in the crunch....

Murray: He would do it.

Allan: Yeah, never let it be said that he couldn't make a decision.

Murray: In this sort of filling in the blank 'laborer,' was this an attempt not to get away from the people?

Allan: Well, I think probably that was part of it, too. And probably it's one of those things where sometimes you kid yourself, you know, about a lot of things. Probably he was only kidding himself. But he probably honestly believed it and tried to live up to that. But I think it was a matter of

identification. This is the way he identified. I know I've always said, personally, I said, "You know, I might occupy a petty middle class position in life, but I identify with the working class."

Murray: And that's what he was doing when he wrote that word. What would Malcolm have filled in the blank with?

Allan: I don't know. I think that this would've meant less to Malcolm. As a matter of fact, I think if Malcolm could've turned around and used something to impress any white man, he would've done it. Not that it's something that he himself would need but it was mainly just to let that guy understand that here was a redskin...

Murray: That was no dummy.

Allan: That was no dummy and he knew his way around. Because his command of the English language was fantastic and in debate

he was absolutely devastating. And while he could be the kindest, most compassionate individual where he dealt with people that were just simple ordinary people...

Murray: Who had no power.

Allan: He could be devastating to people who pretended to be something they weren't, and particularly if they were in any way putting other people down. He would just cut them so down to size that it was almost a cruel put down. Because...

Murray: They were no match.

Allan: They just weren't any match at all.

Murray: Jim wasn't concerned so much with that sort of impressing people in the terms that Malcolm was with white people. Or was he?

Allan: No, I don't think so. I think Jim would sit back quietly and let everybody else do the talking and sit back and probably he would, after a long period of listening, would come up with some remark that would just, you know, almost bring the house down. I listened to him, you know, a few times. Especially when it was native people who have a marvelous sense of humor and he would make some remark...

Murray: Rich with irony.

Allan: And he would make some remark and it was just so simple and straightforward but it never left anything to the imagination. He had put this guy down so nicely and just sit back and the Indian people that were there, they would just laugh and hoot, you know.

Murray: One last question before we both fall asleep. Jim expressed his disgust and disillusionment with the party pretty

early, you know, within five or six years of coming to Saskatchewan. Did Malcolm give up on the party as quickly as Jim or did he stick with it in terms of having hopes for it longer than Jim did?

Allan: I think that Malcolm understood this too because they were both very intelligent people. I think that Malcolm gave up equally as early. You know, they still supported it as the lesser of the evils that were being presented but to hope that any real gains were going to be made in this direction, I think they recognized this quite early. Because I know when I left Prince Albert and we moved, Roberta and I moved to La Ronge, that was a pretty big move for us and that was 1949. Already, you see, you could begin to see these power plays.

Murray: The trends.

Allan: Yeah, and the trends coming. And already we had said amongst ourselves... I said, "You know, I can just see down there where your hope, knowing the people that were trying to move up the ladder in the civil service structure and where some of the..." You see, the CCF had to do things and they could do bold things. Then they're in there and they turn around and they look to consolidate and then they go out and they are looking to try to stay in power. Then after they did a few of these things, you know, the hospitalization thing and there was numerous things that we can say, but look at the long period of time that went on and there wasn't really anything.

Murray: The first three years maybe.

Allan: Yeah, you could look at other provinces around you that, my God, you know, would have Social Credit, would have Liberal or Conservative parties, and they were getting some things done and, you know, there wasn't that zealous type of almost missionary spirit that you had that first while when they bang, bang, bang, they could pass laws, enact acts and they could get going.

And sure, like up here, the superimposition, we realize that this is a mistake. It wasn't a mistake in that the ideas were good because they are still going to have to go back to them. They are still going to have to come back to some of these things. They are plagued today with things. They are going to have to go back to some of the things that they did at that time. But the process of getting people to understand that these ideas are good, to accept them, and to just provide leadership and then have the people demand that these things take place. This is really the whole, you know, the political skills that are necessary is that... It's like the Chinese do. Provide that wise leadership and show the way and then people, at last, are just demanding that you do those things.

Murray: That must've been one of the major goals of both men, was to convince people that that's what they needed was leadership.

Allan: Yeah, I think that they understood this process. I think this is really what they wanted in trying to organize people.

(End of Side A)
(End of Interview)

PROPER NAME INDEX

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